The Cresset (Vol. LV, No. 9) by Valparaiso University
Valparaiso University 
ValpoScholar 
The Cresset (archived issues) 
10-1992 
The Cresset (Vol. LV, No. 9) 
Valparaiso University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/cresset_archive 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public 
Administration Commons 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
The Cresset (archived issues) by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please 
contact a ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
~ ~l""'""" uw.'4£1':Sil1 LIBI\I!Rits oc1 o ~ ,cJJt.. 
fesset Valparaiso University Valparaiso, Indiana 46383 
AlAN F. HARRE, Publisher 
GAIL McGREW EIFRIG, Editor 




3 The Editor I IN LUCE TUA: IN THE MIDDLE 
4 JoEllen Mitchell McGuigan I EXCELLENCE AND INCLUSION: AN ARisrOTELIAN ARGUMENT FOR OPENING THE 
CANON 
11 Randa]. Duvick I "REMEMBER THIS IS WRITING YOU'RE READING": MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HENRY JAMES, FORM 
AND CoNTENT 
15 J. T. Ledbetter I IN TURLEYS WOODS (Verse) 
16 Leonard R. Klein I FROM THE CHAPEL: CHRIST THE KING 
19 Charles Vandersee I LETTERFROM DOGWOOD: POINTS OF LIGHT 
22 Albert R. Trost I THE NATION: AMERICAN MALAISE: ITS DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 
24 Reinhold Dooley I FilM: THE PLAYER: APOSTMODERN MORALITY PLAY 
27 Stu Selthun I GANDHI PIZZA (Verse) 
28 REVIEWS: Contino on Sulivan; &huurman on Taylor ; Gaffney on Gold; Hesselink on Takenaka and O'Grady 
35 Daniel]. Langton : TWO POEMS: SYLVIA; FLESH WOUND (Verse) 
Departmental Editors 
Melody L. Griffin, 
Business Manager 
Wilbur H. Hutchins 
Assistant Managing Editor Advisory Board 
James Albers 
Richard H. W. Brauer, Richard Baepler 
Art Editor James Caristi 
Thomas D. Kennedy, Christine H. Lehmann 
Book Review Editor Alfred Meyer 
Rene Steinke, Arlin G. Meyer 
Poetry Editor Frederick A. Niedner,Jr. 
J ane Layman • ." ~ : •: : • Mel Piehl . . . .. . . ... . 
Ral h K1 .. • ••• • •••• •• ··.Mark &hwehn p ~p1-': ••• • • • • • 
Cof!Y • •.: •• ••••• ~ ... ·... . ... . . . . ·. : . ... . ... ·. . ... 
THE~RESSET is puhl\$ll1iq:~~~thly"~ng the academic year, 
SeptenltJer thr?~~M)~: bl• ~:~alp<f'?i~ University Press as a 
foruM :fpr ~» ~fltf infoQ'J!ed'.t>f>mion, J:he views expressed are • • t..• • • • • • •• • • 
those:.Of·h~~· wr~t.,l"(.a.nd do not ~t'~essarily reflect the . . . ... - ... 
prepo~ance 8f.<':>ituon at Valparotpv,.•University. Manuscripts 
should.h:a."a.ddr~d to the Editor:1nd" accompanied by return 
postage\L~t~r.s to the Editor for p\iblication are subject to 
editing fot•b/~i'tY: T.he Book Review Index and the American 
Humanities In<le"x li~r Cr"asset reviews. Second class postage is paid 
at Valparaiso, lndia~;.."Regular Subscription rates: one year-
$8.50; two years-$14.75; Student subscription rates: one year- $4; 
single copy- $.75. Entire contents copyrighted 1992 by the 
Valparaiso University Press, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383, without 
whose written permission reproduction in whole or in part for 
any purpose whatsoever is expressly forbidden. 
Above: Joel Sheesley, Kneeling Down, 1992, oil on canvas, 68 x 90 
inches. 
Cover: Joel Sheesley, Abraham's Puzzle, 1991, oil on canvas, 62 x 72 
inches. 
Back cover: Joel Sheesley, Lot Flees Sodom, 1991, oil on canvas, 72 x 
48 inches. 
These paintings are from an October solo Sheesley exhibit at VU. 
Here this Wheaton College painting professor presents recent 
realist paintings of young family life in suburbia. Using these 
images as metaphors of Biblical stories, Sheesley explores hidden 
ironies in the Americn suburban dream. 
The Cresset 
In the Middle 
We're a long way from what O.P. Kretzmann liked to 
call the high noon of the twentieth century. Wondering 
the other day what it might have felt like to be in that 
middle-! was ten at the time, and not inclined to 
metaphysics, so it passed me by without my noticing--gave 
me pause. On so many of today's issues I seem to be in the 
middle, at least as I sense the boundaries set up by the 
people who write or speak nationally. In terms of 
generations, I'm too late for the Silent Generation, too 
early for the Baby Boomers. I'm also in that group of folks 
who have children yet to provide for, and parents to worry 
about. Here too I seem to be in the middle. 
More than this, though, the quality of mind which 
seeks a middle characterizes what is for me most 
praiseworthy in human endeavor. If I had posters in my 
office, the Hunk for my wall (if I were being my best self) 
wouldn't be Gerard Depardieu. My choice would be Cyrus 
Vance-what a guy! The achievements of the heroic 
extremist pale before those of the person who can pull two 
sides closer to a middle. Thus, while the world needed 
Martin Luther King, Jr., it also needs Will Campbell, 
understanding and ministering to the Klansman as to the 
Freedom Rider. 
At its worst, of course, this attitude means never 
having to say you're sorry, because you've never said, done, 
or thought anything that could bother anyone. Later on, 
you can always point to your careful non-involvement in 
any cause. You don't have to establish deniability because 
you were never in a position to have anything to deny. But 
at its best, the tendency may spring from and result in 
strong feelings of connectedness. People on both sides of 
an issue may have claims--as friends, sisters, parents--such 
that one cannot dismiss them, and their unwelcome 
ideology, simply. Thus dialogue becomes a necessity, and 
exploration, diffidence, and humility a characteristic mode 
of discourse. 
Such a view may explain why, to many people, the 
old-fashioned academic may seem disconnected from 
"reality." Crisp decision-making rules the day. Your 
bumper stickers should be congruent; one seldom sees 
"Visualize World Peace" and "Support Our Troops" on the 
same car. But ideally, the academic mind has this capacity 
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INLUCETUA 
to look around, and in some manner to see both behind 
and before. To give weight to both past and future 
inevitably gives a person the sense of being in the middle. 
The historical view and the prophetic view converge in this: 
they see the present as a contingent, not a culminating 
moment. 
Now that so much of our public discourse is shaped 
by the metaphors of struggle and contention-the term 
"culture wars" being only the most forthright-perhaps we 
do well to give some effort to thinking in the middle, to the 
re-establishment of the means of creating middle spaces in 
our arguments. To some extent, such an activity defines 
The Cresset, one of a decreasing number of journals not 
devoted to one side or another of a cause, but seeking to 
give space for a number of positions held by people who 
desire to be engaged with what they must, at least 
temporarily, call "the other side." 
In this issue, two more articles developed from the 
Cresset Colloquium occupy the first pages. Professor 
McGuigan's article is long, and dense, but its careful 
reasoning and calm deliberation merit attention even from 
those of us who read philosophy only when prodded by a 
sharp stick. Professor Duvick applies toliterature the 
principles of communitarian discourse, providing an 
elegant demonstration that learning happens best with 
openness to possibility. 
Other articles too describe a spectrum-not certainly 
the widest one could describe, but nevertheless modestly 
divergent. Still, their common element seems to me the 
desire to speak- would "lovingly" be too soft and maternal 
a term? Before the next Cresset appears, all of us will have 
to have made many choices, and those we make on the 
ballot are only the most public. My hope is that we work at 
seeing our choices modestly. To continue with a spatial 
metaphor, I wish that we could learn to see our choices 
not so much as a defiant staking out of positions, but 
rather as necessary interruptions in the process of 




EXCELLENCE AND INCLUSION: 
AN ARISTOTELIAN ARGUMENT FOR OPENING THE CANON 
As part of my participation in the Cresset 
Colloquium last spring I was given the opportunity to read 
and reflect on two recent works written by woman scholars: 
Transforming Knowledge by Elizabeth Minnich and Love's 
Knowledge by Martha Nussbaum. Though there was no 
particular need to relate the work of one to the other 
notwithstanding the appearance of "knowledge" in the title 
of both books it struck me immediately that there was an 
important point of connection between them. Minnich's 
book is a critique of the Academy, one designed to 
promote the inclusion of more work by women and 
persons of color in the university curriculum. On the 
other hand, Nussbaum's essays in Love's Knowledge present 
a demonstration of what philosophy done in "a different 
voice" can be like. As I read Nussbaum's unique treatment 
of literature and philosophy, as I worked through her 
cognitivist account of the emotions, as I read and reflected 
on her insistence that Aristotelian conceptions of 
rationality and the good life could be highly instructive for 
us today, I could not help thinking that this was just the 
sort of work Minnich was proffering for inclusion in the 
canon, not because its inclusion would satisfY the demands 
for political correctness, but because the work itself has the 
potential for transforming our very conception of the 
world, for constituting, in other words "transforming 
knowledge" of the sort Minnich places at the heart of the 
university's enterprise. 
While Minnich sometimes made her claims 
awkwardly, even abrasively, for me there was no mistaking 
the importance of her fundamental point-traditional 
conceptions of what counts as knowledge, of what sort of 
characteristics quality a work as excellent, have been far too 
limited to do justice to our students. It is this claim of 
Minnich's that I want to write about here. Somewhat 
ironically, I intend to do so not by laying out and analyzing 
JoEllen McGuigan teaches in the VU School of Law. Her law 
degree is from UCLA ( 1975) ; she is currently a candidate for the 
Ph.D. from the University of Utah. Her interests in law and 
philosophy combine through work in political theory. In the spring 
semester of 1993, she will offer an undergraduate course in 
feminist philosophy. 
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her particular arguments, but by actually trying to do a bit 
of philosophy on Nussbaum's Aristotelian model. In these 
few pages I hope to sketch an Aristotelian conception of 
distributive justice as applied to the university. In so doing, 
I intend to suggest at least one justification for opening up 
the curriculum to the works of women and members of 
other under-represented groups, by suggesting how our 
conception of excellence could be enlarged using 
Aristotelian notions of human flourishing, inclusively 
understood. But, before I present you with my own ideas, a 
summary of Nussbaum's arguments for Aristotelian 
distribution is in order. 
I. Nussbaum on Aristotle on Distribution 
In recent essays such as "Aristotelian Social 
Democracy" and "Nature Function and Capability: 
Aristotle on Political Distribution" Nussbaum has been 
exploring the possibility that an Aristotelian conception of 
justice might provide a real alternative to liberal principles 
of distribution. This is the case because at the heart of 
much of Aristotle's work on politics and society lies the 
fundamental question: what is the good for human beings? 
It is Nussbaum's belief that controversies over how to allot 
material wealth, institutional and social opportunities, even 
political power, cannot be resolved without first 
confronting this basic question . Her belief stands in 
contrast to the approach of political philosophers in the 
liberal tradition such as Mill, or John Rawls in his 1971 A 
Theory of Justice, who approach distributive questions with a 
steadfastly agnostic attitude toward the possessions, objects, 
experiences, activities, and opportunities that we ought to 
hold constitutive of a good human life. 
At best, theorists like Rawls have only a "thin" theory 
of good which validates only those "primary" goods 
assumed to be desired by any person regardless of her 
general conception of a life well lived. Utilitarians share 
with Rawls an aversion to promoting one conception of the 
good for persons over another, being generally skeptical of 
an account of the good that could have determinate 
content and be objectively validated. As a result they leave 
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to the particular preferences of individual persons the 
resolution of what is choiceworthy and what is not. Of 
course there are many critical differences between Rawls' 
theory and utilitarianism, the most important of which is 
Rawls' deontological orientation. But in approaching 
distributive questions with no articulate theory of the good, 
such political theorists fall back on the principle of 
maximization as at least one main device of their 
distributive approach. Thus, as Nussbaum points out, 
Rawls takes it to be evident that if some wealth and income 
is necessary to any life, and therefore in that sense some 
wealth and income constitute primary goods, it can also be 
assumed that "most persons prefer a greater, rather than a 
smaller share of wealth and income" (Rawls, 396). 
Similarly it is the distinguishing feature of utilitarianism 
most generally understood, that the maximization overall 
of whatever is preferred or desired by persons is the goal of 
any efficient distribution. 
Aristotle's central placement of the question of what 
is the good for humans stands as a challenge to the notion 
that a general principle of maximization could ever be an 
adequate basic approach to distributive issues. From his 
perspective, it is not possible to assume that more wealth is 
better than less wealth, without understanding how riches 
affect human excellence and the possibility of actually 
achieving a life well lived. On an Aristotelian view, external 
goods, like any tool, all have a limit of instrumental use 
that can only be established by reference to what such 
goods are actually useful for. Without a contentful general 
theory of the good, such a reference cannot be made. 
Perhaps more importantly, the Aristotelian would hold that 
without a rich theory of the good, there is no means by 
which to distinguish merely instrumental from intrinsic 
goods. Hence, distributive schemes which aim at 
maximization of undifferentiated particular goods without 
any theory of how they relate to a human life well-lived are 
fundamentally incoherent. 
Of course for the proponent of any specific vision of 
the good, the problem has always been to objectively 
legitimate its substantive content, to establish it as the 
justified account over competing alternatives. But, the 
Aristotelian has a plausible response to this problem, for 
from her perspective, the good for human beings can be 
articulated by reference to human nature, which in turn 
yields the notion of excellent human functioning, or, full 
human flourishing. From this perspective, only 
possessions, objects, experiences, activities and 
opportunities that actually promote full human flourishing 
should be subject to distribution, and then only in the right 
amounts. Hence, not every preference or desire implies a 
distributive claim and the device of maximization ceases to 
have any favored status in the system of allotment. We 
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need not, for instance, count the desire for tobacco as 
equivalent to the desire for knowledge in trying to 
determine a just distribution of available social resources. 
Taking her lead from Aristotle then, it is Nussbaum's 
view that "the things that one cannot have too much and 
more is always better than less" are "the capabilities out of 
which excellent functioning, doing well and living well, can 
be selected" (Nussbaum 1988, 152). Hence, the purpose 
of political arrangements is and ought to be to "effect the 
transition from one level of [human] capacity to another" 
(146). And, thus, the best distributive scheme is the one 
that best provides the persons subject to it with the 
necessary conditions of their fully human flourishing. 
Now it is not Nussbaum's project simply to argue for 
the superiority of the Aristotelian conception of the good 
over accounts that remain agnostic on the question of what 
is choiceworthy for humans and take the task of good 
political arrangements to be to maximize our given desires 
or preferences overall, whether they be for push-pin, 
daytime TV or great works of art. The intuitive appeal of 
liberal conceptions of liberty make establishing the 
superiority of the Aristotelian vision difficult, complex and 
controversial. While Nussbaum's work has contributed 
significantly to the whole debate between communitarians 
and liberals, it is also a central aim of her writing to 
develop the distributive implications of the Aristotelian 
approach to their fullest in order to demonstrate its 
potential as an inclusive democratic vision. It is this aspect 
of her analysis that I want to exploit in my application of 
her views to the university. But how does Nussbaum hope 
to convince us that Aristotelianism has within it a rich 
theory of the good that promotes just distributions and is 
also inclusive? To understand this aspect of her work, it is 
necessary to connect the Aristotelian understanding of the 
good as excellent human functioning to notions of human 
capacity and eligibility for membership in the polity. 
II. Human Functioning, Human Excellence, and 
Virtue. 
It is the key piece in Nussbaum's argument that 
attention to human nature will yield, at an acceptable level 
of generality, just one determinate set of human 
functionings from which correlative particular goods may 
be ascertained. Of course it is just this claim that liberal 
political theorists question. Nonetheless, in her view, these 
are the goods that turn out to be constituents of the good 
life, in that they enable us to effectuate a multiplicity of 
uniquely human functionings by enabling us to develop a 
diversity of capabilities correlative to those functionings. It 
is this last move, from function to capacity, that contains 
the democratic implications Nussbaum wants to develop 
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and extend from the Aristotelian vision. But not just any 
sort of activity undertaken by a human being constitutes 
uniquely human functioning and so not just any capacity 
possessed by humans constitutes a basis for particular 
distributive claims. To hold otherwise would be to 
reformulate the Aristotelian vision into a kind of liberalism 
where every capacity possessed by a person-be it for drug 
addiction or cruelty--would give rise to a potential 
distributive claim, regardless· of whether the exercise of 
that capacity promotes excellent human functioning or 
not. Clearly, the Aristotelian conception of human 
functioning and its relation to human capacity must be 
understood before the plausibility of its power to provide 
us with a contentful theory of the good can be assessed. 
The classic statement of this conception is found in 
Aristotle's argument connecting the good with excellent 
human functioning found in Book One of the Nicomachean 
Ethics. 
In the beginning sections of Book One, Aristotle has 
posed the question of what ends we pursue for their own 
sake, and not for the sake of other ends. In response, he 
identifies happiness as such an end: 
Now happiness is thought to be such an end most of all, for it is 
this that we choose always for its own sake and never for the sake 
of something else; and as for honor and pleasure and intellect 
and every virtue, we choose them for their own sake ... but we also 
choose them for the sake of happiness, believing that through 
these we shall be happy, but no one chooses happiness for the 
sake of these, nor, in general, for the sake of some other thing. 
(EN. 1097bl-6) 
On these grounds, Aristotle identifies happiness with the 
good, for he holds that only that which we pursue for its 
own sake can constitute the good. 
But, the point of the arguments in the Nicomachean 
Ethics is to demonstrate the best way to live, not to establish 
the foundation for an ethical philosophy grounded in 
hedonism. So, it is Aristotle's task to generate content for 
this notion of the good that goes beyond an identification 
of happiness with that which we pursue for its own sake. 
This he does by associating real happiness with excellent 
human functioning: 
Perhaps to say that happiness is the highest good is something 
which appears to be agreed upon; what we miss, however, is a 
more explicit statement as to what it is. Perhaps this might be 
given if the function of a man is taken into consideration . For 
just as in a flute-player or a statue-maker or any artist or, in 
general, in anyone who has a function or an action to perform the 
goodness or excellence lies in that function, so it would seem to 
be the case in a man, if indeed he has a function . But, should we 
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hold that while a carpenter and a shoemaker have certain 
functions or actions to perform, a man has none at all, but is by 
nature without a function? Is it not more reasonable to posit that, 
just as an eye and a hand and a foot and any part of the body in 
general appear to have certain functions, so a man has some 
function other than these? What then should that function be? 
(EN. 1097b20-33) 
To warrant this move from an undifferentiate d 
notion of the good as happiness to a contentful conception 
of the good as human functioning, Aristotle has to 
demonstrate that there is some function unique to human 
beings alone. This he does by identifying the life of a 
human being as " the life of action of a being who has 
reason"(EN. 1098a3-5). While we share a life of nutrition 
and growth with plants and also a life of perception with 
animals, we are unique in the worldly scheme of things as 
beings who possess the capacity to act, reflectively and 
according to reason. As a result, any conception of the 
good for man, of happiness for man as a species being 
with unique attributes, will have to take the human capacity 
to act according to reason into account, in fact will have to 
give it a central position. So, following the identification of 
the good with happiness, happiness in turn with human 
functioning, and unique human functioning with our 
capacity to act as reason dictates, Aristotle believes that he 
is justified to "posit the function of a man to be a certain 
kind of life, namely, activity or actions of the soul with 
reason" (EN. 1098al3-14). Moreover, this does not 
provide us with a minimal standard of human functioning 
only, for "the function of a man is generically the same as 
that of a good man, like that of a lyre player and a good 
lyre player"(EN. 1098a9-10) so that "excellence with 
respect to virtue" ought to be added to that function. 
Hence, "the good for man turns out to be an activity of the 
soul [reason] according to virtue ... " (EN. 1098al5-17) . 
Hence, the "good for man" just is excellent human 
functioning, where the identification of excellence with 
virtue is understood. 
Now Aristotle does not give the term "virtue" its 
modern meaning of moral rectitude with connotations of 
chasteness, virginity and the like. Rather, he wants to 
explain virtue and its correlative, excellence, by reference 
to action and to use it in his analysis to establish that the 
best human life is the one the strives for the realization of 
practical wisdom. So later in Book Two, Aristotle tells us: 
[Ethical] virtue, then, is a habit, disposed toward action by 
deliberate choice, being at the mean relative to us, and defined by 
reason, as a prudent man would define iL It is a mean between 
two vices, one by excess and the other by deficiency; and while 
some of the vices exceed while the others are deficient in what is 
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right in feelings and actions, virtue finds and chooses the mean. 
(EN. 1106b35-1107a5) 
By these various arguments, Aristotle has taken us 
from the good, to happiness, to human functioning, and 
then finally, to excellent human functioning as the 
undertaking of our actions in accordance with practical 
reason, that is, as the performing of actions deliberately 
chosen in accordance with virtue, where virtue is 
understood as the disposition to effect actions that 
practical reason establishes as being at the mean relative to 
us. But what real relevance does this theory of the good 
have for political questions about how to distribute a 
society's wealth and opportunity? From Nussbaum's 
perspective it is simply this: on an Aristotelian model, the 
good society does not just aim at increasing wealth, at 
enlarging the GNP, but rather it actively promotes the 
excellent human functioning, the full human flourishing, 
of its members. And, this goal has rather significant 
distributive implications of both a negative and a positive 
sort. It serves to limit the list of goods subject to the 
distribution to those things that promote or effectuate 
excellent human functioning. And, with regard to these, it 
requires that each individual receive only the amount that 
best promotes her functioning, not necessarily the amount 
she desires. Following the negative implications of a view 
such as this, for example, we would not have to count the 
smoker's desire for more and more cigarettes as something 
that social resources ought to be devoted to satisfying. We 
would have an articulate reason to justify choosing to 
spend resources on things like art and education and 
medical care instead. 
But, perhaps an even more striking distributive effect 
of Aristotle's theory of the good is that it provides rather 
strong arguments for the notion of positive entitlements to 
societal resources like education, health care and more. If 
the good for human beings just is excellent human 
functioning, and if the good society just is one that takes as 
its prime purpose the promotion of that sort of functioning 
in its members, then the good society has a positive 
obligation, within the limits of its resources, to provide 
them with the things that they need to flourish-from basic 
goods such as food and shelter, to more complex resources 
like a fine education, sports and artistic experiences, 
appropriate contexts within which to raise children, outlets 
for sexuality and other forms of personal expression, 
opportunities to politically participate, chances to meet 
others and to communicate with them in friendship, 
outlets for spirituality, chances to enjoy beauty, 
opportunities to develop a special skill, trade or hobby and 
the like. All of these things would qualify as goods to be 
distributed, because they are all important in some way to 
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make full human functioning possible and each relates in 
some sense to various human capacities. Following an 
Aristotelian conception like this, a society that wished to be 
counted as good would not leave the development of the 
functioning of its members to the exigencies of the market 
and one's possibility of fully flourishing would not depend 
on the accidents of one's birth. Now, while the 
AristoteEan conception generates a rather impressive list of 
positive entitlements, some argue that it tells us nothing 
about who is to qualify as a recipient of such a distribution. 
It has been an effective liberal critique of the Aristotelian 
political vision that Aristotle himself promoted the 
superiority of an aristocracy, denigrated women, justified 
slavery and excluded common working people from 
political participation, among other things. Nonetheless, 
Nussbaum asserts that contained within the broader 
distributive implications of Aristotle's approach to the 
good is an argument for an inclusive, a democratic, vision 
of the proper way to allot society's resources. Nussbaum 
takes it as part of her project to reconstruct Aristotle and by 
so doing, to liberate the Aristotelian vision from its 
aristocratic, anti-democratic past. 
III. Capacity, Practical Reason, and Inclusion 
From an analysis of various clues in the text, even 
including attention to Aristotle's infamous treatment of 
women and slaves, Nussbaum concludes that the necessary 
and sufficient condition for qualifying as a recipient of a 
just distribution is possessing by one's very nature a less 
developed capability, a basic capacity, to eventually 
perform the particular actions required by the context of 
one's life in accordance with practical reason. The core 
notion here is that the dictates of practical reason, 
determined by reference to an embedded potential life 
history, generate a number of human functions, of 
potential human excellences that can be related back to 
basic capabilities that give rise to their possible actual 
exercise when nurtured by appropriate education and 
other resources. This general criterion can be reduced to 
the notion that persons who possess, by their nature, a 
minimum practical rational capacity that could be 
developed by the receipt of social resources like education 
are entitled to be included in the distribution. 
Now members of groups that have been excluded 
from political participation and stinted in societal 
distributive schemes are understandably wary of an 
approach to eligibility for full membership in the polity 
based on one's capacity for rationality. After all, it was just 
this criterion that Aristotle believed women and slaves 
could not satisfy by their very nature. Some hold that the 
notion of rationality itself is so ambiguous, so flexible, that 
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it can be manipulated easily to provide a seemingly neutral 
basis for excluding certain human beings subject to a 
political system that affects and controls them from any 
claim to participation in it. This is a serious problem and 
one that cannot be easily resolved. Much of Nussbaum's 
work on distributive justice, however, consists in suggesting 
how this challenge might be met within a general 
Aristotelian framework by using the broad strategy of 
logically extending and developing the implications of 
fundamental Aristotelian notions con sis ten tly. From 
Nussbaum's perspective, Aristotle himself failed to 
consistently analyze the requirements of his own basic 
doctrines when he wrote about women, slaves and laborers. 
Where might we go then in Aristotle's work to obtain 
a more specific understanding of the general requirement 
of the capacity to become practically wise? How can we 
understand how to tailor this basic notion to the 
circumstances of particular lives, lived in specific context by 
persons who have individual, but undeveloped, latent 
talents that might be relevant to a multiplicity of special 
human functionings performed in myriad circumstances? 
How can we in turn transform what we find into modern 
arguments for inclusion within an Aristotelian framework? 
In my view the richest source in Aristotle's own work is the 
practica~ the context sensitive, aspect of practical reason. 
Aristotle's basic notion of practical reason suffers 
from a certain ambiguity that we can see replicated in 
Nussbaum's analysis of the correlative concepts of human 
functioning and human capacity. This is the case because 
practical reason possesses some attributes that are very 
difficult to understand, stemming from its functional 
nature. While Aristotle sometimes talks as though the 
person who is practically wise possesses a general abstract 
property that exhibits the quintessential human attribute, it 
is also quite clear from the manner in which he works out 
the details of his theory that the notion of practical wisdom 
can only receive its determinate content in use, when 
practical reason is being exercised to dictate virtuous 
action in particular circumstances. Understood in this way, 
the notion of practical reason has a kind of modal quality 
to it, for it captures the notion of the possibility of choosing 
to behave in a certain manner in a future context. To be 
practically wise just is to act in response to specific 
conditions as the prudent person would, that is, to 
conform one's conduct to generate only those actions that 
are "at the mean, relative to us" in our particular 
circumstance. To think of practical reason in its potential 
state, then, is to think of it as a general disposition to act in 
such a way on particular occasions. To think of it in its 
actual state is to conceive of it in terms of actual choices 
made, of determinate performed actions undertaken in 
context, all of which exhibit behavior stemming from one's 
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general disposition, from one's general capacity to be 
practically wise, but each of which displays conduct at the 
mean, relative to the actor in her particular circumstance. 
As a result, practical reason is constituted both by a 
general disposition and a series of actual deeds undertaken 
by particular persons in response to requirements for 
action stemming from real life. It is not surprising then, 
that we can become confused over whether practical 
reason refers to one general human functioning, or many, 
whether it is foreshadowed by one general human capacity, 
or many particular capabilities that might be activated in 
the circumstances of individual cases. This is important to 
efforts both to understand and extend the implications of 
Aristotle's views, because the more and varied the functions 
and capabilities that the notion of practical reason 
supports, the more and diverse are the persons who can 
stake their claim to inclusion in the distribution. In my 
view, a correct analysis of practical reason combines both 
its general and particular aspects, both its potential and 
actual manifestations, but places the greatest emphasis on 
its context sensitive character. To analyze it otherwise is 
simply to denigrate its practical character. Practical reason 
is that which enables us to live well by enabling us to 
choose to act, when required by the exigencies of our 
situation, in a manner that conforms to the dictates of 
virtue in the actual circumstance presented. As such, it 
allows, even presupposes, reference to diverse human 
contexts, to diverse correlative capabilities and, most 
importantly, to diverse human actions and actors in the 
determination of who is entitled to be included in a just 
distribution of any policy's material wealth and social 
opportunities. 
To put my argument in another way, the contexts of 
practical reason range over all human endeavors with 
social value, including those previously undertaken just by 
women, or slaves or laborers. Moreover, the association of 
excellence with practical reason, and practical reason in 
turn with the myriad contexts of human life as it is actually 
lived, counts against an elitist, exclusionist understanding 
of that term. A person is excellent, a work is excellent, an 
institution is excellent in Aristotelian terms insofar as each 
reflects the unique human capacity for acting in 
accordance with practical reason in the context at hand. 
In attempting to amass knowledge, to understand our 
human predicament, to forge a society that works, we 
cannot treat some contexts that are obviously essential to 
human life as though they are meaningless, simply because 
they have been the circumstances to which the less 
powerful in our society have been consigned. Nor can we 
afford to view the practical wisdom, the knowledge gained 
in those settings, as somehow not excellent because it is 
possessed by those who have not been included in the past. 
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The Aristotelian conception of practical reason has no 
determinable content, in fact is powerless to supply us with 
a rich theory of the good, unless we are willing to recognize 
that by its very nature it requires diversity for its meaning. 
If we recognize the essential importance of diversity for our 
rich theory of the good, the distributive implications of our 
theory must be inclusively understood as well. 
In developing his specific ideas about the virtues of 
character, in attempting to show the significance of 
practical reason in various contexts, Aristotle described 
many human endeavors and activities that he obviously 
valued and in regard to which he believed humans could 
function excellently and attain practical wisdom. He talked 
about the lyre player and the general, the ship's captain 
and the carpenter. In addition, he should have talked 
about the wife tending her child or cooking food, about 
the slave tending her master, about the laborer planting 
the fields, for each provides a context of unique human 
endeavor of human function that can be done well or ill, 
that can be performed through actions chosen in 
accordance with reason or not. As such, each provides a 
circumstance in which the unique human capacity to be 
practically wise is essential and can yield knowledge 
valuable for all. Unless we are willing to hold with Aristotle 
that women and persons of color and common laborers are 
indeed different sorts of beings altogether, unless we are 
willing to agree that they have a different species-being 
that does not allow for their capacity to be practically wise, 
we cannot exclude them from full participation in the 
distribution of a just society. 
IV. Distribution and the University 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this piece, it was 
my intention to apply the distributive implications of 
Nussbaum's recent work to the university in general, in 
order to make an argument for the inclusion of scholarly 
work by women, persons of color, and members of other 
under-represented groups in the canon. Many claims have 
been made for such inclusion based on intuitive notions of 
fairness. Mine has a different focus and consists basically in 
this point: if the university can be thought to embody a 
thick theory of the good on an Aristotelian model, then 
consistency requires that it be committed to diversity in the 
allocation of all the resources that it represents. The canon 
is one such resource subject to apportionment, and so it 
should contain the excellent works of members of the 
polity generated from all socially useful contexts. What 
follows is a brief sketch of the argument supporting these 
claims. I begin my analysis with a number of explicit 
assumptions. 
The first is that access to education in general and to 
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a university education of a particular kind is a societal 
resource subject to distributive claims. While for the 
purposes of my argument, the university should be thought 
of as a resource, it should also be conceived of as a society 
within a society, charged with making distributions within 
its own sphere and subject to scrutiny on the question of 
whether those distributions are just and consistent with its 
mission, again understood on an Aristotelian model. 
The second is that there is an abundance of excellent 
scholarly work by women, persons of color and others from 
under-represented groups that could be included within 
the curriculum. I take it as simply not plausible, as false, 
that the reason for the absence of such work is its non-
existence or its lack of merit. This is especially the case 
when one gives excellence its particularly Aristotelian twist 
and associates it with the core notion of practical reason. I 
invite anyone who questions these claims to actually survey 
the work that is available, that has been available for a very 
long time and that is being generated currently in order to 
make an independent evaluation. In making this 
evaluation, I would urge the reader to also consider that 
this work carries with it additional value, because it 
represents practical wisdom generated from contexts that 
we do not know enough about. 
Finally, I take it as non-controversial that the students 
attending the university will continue to come from more 
and more diverse backgrounds, from more and different 
racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, geographic and class 
contexts and that the high enrollment of women, especially 
at the undergraduate level, will continue. Moreover, I take 
it that these phenomena are positive, and that such 
students represent a particularly various set of human 
capacities and potentially excellent human functions that 
need to be developed. 
One of the most important aspects of my argument is 
constituted by the claim that on an Aristotelian model, 
education is perhaps the critical social resource subject to 
distribution. This is true because of the connection 
between nascent human capacities and excellent human 
functionings. While it is very difficult to develop one's 
capacities, one's talents, without basic goods such as food 
and shelter, education is that resource which most brings 
out the unique human facility for reason, as it is to be 
applied practically in various contexts, so that full human 
flourishing is possible. It is an obvious subtext of Aristotle's 
work that providing education to human beings, so that 
they may learn how to live well, is perhaps the most 
important task of the good society. 
The university's role in this general endeavor is quite 
obvious. While some might hold that the university is to be 
removed from the general society to provide a place of 
peace and quiet contemplation for the development of 
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abstract knowledge, of, as Aristotle calls it theoria, closer 
attention to his arguments will reveal that it is also to be a 
repository of practical wisdom, of phromsis. This is true in 
part because the university is to be an integrated 
component of the whole society, and as such, actively 
involved in realizing its general goals. And, the very 
projects that provide the subject matter for study are those 
that arise from the context of real life. It is an essential 
aspect of Aristotle's own methodology that he culled his 
ethical, political, and philosophical problems from real life, 
that he thought the knowledge really worth pursuing arose 
in the first instance from the actual context of human 
existence. Such a view of knowledge places central 
emphasis on the notion of practical wisdom and creates the 
implication that such wisdom is complementary, or 
perhaps even continuous, with more abstract learning 
conceived on the model of theoria. Thus on an Aristotelian 
account, practical wisdom lies at the heart of the 
university's enterprise. 
If the university is to be a repository for practical 
wisdom, it is even more important to realize that it is 
perhaps the prime societal institution in which humans will 
actually be encouraged to fulfill the development of their 
disposition to act from reason according to virtue. Within 
the context of the university, students are to have the 
opportunity to develop habits of choosing to act with 
reason according to virtue, that is, of bringing forth their 
latent capacity to effect actions that practical reason 
establishes as being at the mean relative to them. They 
cannot achieve this general goal if the body of wisdom 
available in the university is radically incomplete, because 
it does not provide for all of the contexts of human 
endeavor in which excellent human functioning is called 
for, because it does not include teaching by persons who 
have achieved the state of practical wisdom in those 
contexts, or because it limits exposure to just those 
scholarly works legitimated by the traditional canon. 
Practical wisdom is also more easily developed in the 
young of a society, when they can identify some of their 
teachers and some of their texts with the circumstances of 
their own lives. At the moment, we tolerate a state of 
affairs in American universities in which a very high 
proportion of our students are never exposed to work 
written by members of their own gender, race or class. It 
was my own experience to go through the course work and 
the comprehensive examinations for an entire Ph.D . 
program in philosophy without ever once being called 
upon to read a work written by a woman. How can the 
university be performing its mission in accordance with a 
rich theory of the good founded on diverse and excellent 
human functioning, when so many aspects of life and so 
much practical wisdom is being denied to the very students 
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whose capacities we are endeavoring to develop? Certainly 
we are not preparing them to go out and to live in 
accordance with virtue in the myriad contexts within which 
they will be called upon to act, so long as the domain of 
knowledge available in the university is so restricted. 
Finally, all students with the capability ought to be 
given the opportunity to develop their capacity to become 
true scholars, if we are serious about applying the 
distributive implications of Aristotle's conception of the 
good to the university. Scholars need recognized outlets for 
their work and in order to make that work meaningful and 
authentic, they also need to draw on their life experiences 
in developing it. The possibility of having one's work 
included in the canon cannot be ignored as the logical 
extension of one's project as a scholar. By including 
women and persons of color in the university community, 
as the Aristotelian conception of the good society requires, 
we are obliged to accept the real possibility that their work 
be included in the curriculum, on pain of inconsistency if 
we fail to do so. 
I have been particularly interested to apply an 
Aristotelian analysis of distributive issues to the university, 
because it seems to me to be one institution in society that 
is already committed to achieving a rich theory of the 
good. This is even more true of a university with a 
dedication to the Christian tradition , because of that 
tradition's commitment to the moral equality of persons 
and the inclusive implications that that commitment 
entails. I have intended to make an argument that does 
not fall back on intuitive appeals to fairness, powerful 
though those might be; rather it has been my desire to 
convince you that failing to open up the canon to the 
works of diverse scholars involves a failure of the very 
enterprise of the university itself. If we take it as our 
charge to promote fully human flourishing in the 
university environment, if we see it as our role to help 
bring forth the myriad human functionings out of the 
various human capacities of all of our students, if we place 
the development of practical wisdom at the core of our 
undertaking, then we cannot present a curriculum to our 
students that ignores the many, many rich and varied 
contexts out of which such capacities and functioning, such 
practical wisdom, spring.O 
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"REMEMBER, THIS IS WRITING YOU'RE READING": 
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HENRY JAMES, FORM AND CONTENT 
As part of the academic community, and particularly 
as a teacher of literature and language, I spend a good deal 
of time thinking and talking about the relationship 
between texts' form and their content. How does one best 
guide students through texts as different-and yet as 
similar-as those of Marcel Proust and those of Nathalie 
Sarraute? How does one write an effective grant proposal? 
How does one convince a student that the way she writes is 
as important as what she writes? 
I was excited, then, to discover that the form-content 
issue is at the heart of Martha Nussbaum's Lave's Knowledge. 
What she calls the "project" of this collection of essays is in 
fact an exploration of what she sees as the interdependent 
relationship between philosophy and literature. A moral 
philosopher, she is concerned at bottom with exploring the 
question "How should one live?" For Nussbaum, the 
search for answers to this question must be wide-ranging, 
must be sensitive, must be loving. And importantly, she 
sees this search not only expressed in philosophical texts, 
but embodied in the forms and structures of novels. She 
argues that, precisely because of their nature as narrative, 
novels can investigate and express certain fundamental 
truths in ways that philosophical writings cannot. Her 
proposal is "that we should add the study of certain novels 
to the study of [recognized great philosophical works in 
ethics], on the grounds that without them we will not have 
a fully adequate statement of a powerful ethical 
conception" (27). 
Narrative fiction constitutes a particularly appropriate 
vehicle for the Aristotelian point of view she takes up: her 
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exploration of "An Aristotelian Conception of Private and 
Public Rationality" argues for making moral choices based 
on both the particularity and the context of the situation in 
which the decision-maker finds herself. As Nussbaum 
expresses it in a recent article in the Times Literary 
Supplement, "The whole of character is taken to be 
available for ethical cultivation; and human goodness 
requires not just obeying certain external rules, but also 
forming choice, desire, passion and attention, in a 
comprehensive and exacting way over the course of an 
entire life" (TLS 1 0). A novel sets before us people in 
situations with choices to make; shows us the results of 
those choices; allows us to observe the growth or at least 
the changes in characters who must choose their actions 
according to new knowledge and changed situations. The 
novelist can show us "the course of an entire life," can 
create characters who are "forming choice, desire, passion 
and attention." We can learn from the lives of characters 
who are sincerely seeking moral truth, characters who are 
"finely aware and richly responsible," as Henry James puts 
it in the preface to The Princess Casamassima. 
A central component in Nussbaum's project linking 
philosophy and the novel is her desire "to suggest, with 
Aristotle, that practical reasoning unaccompanied by 
emotion is not sufficient for practical wisdom" ( 40). Just as 
philosophical prose by itself is not sufficient to answer the 
question of how to live, she contends, intellectual 
calculation cannot alone lead to moral wisdom. Nussbaum 
argues that, according to the Aristotelian view, the fact that 
emotions are directly connected to some of our most 
deeply-held ideas about what is important means that in 
some cases those emotions are more trustworthy than 
calculated intellectual reasoning. And indeed, in a novel, 
not only do the characters feel and often act according to 
those feelings, giving the reader a more realistic 
representation of life situations in which moral choices are 
made, the reader is also emotionally caught up in the 
story, with the characters-and thus led by her emotional 
involvement to a truer understanding of the moral lesson 
to be learned. 
Nussbaum carries out her project in part by 
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examining the search for moral truth as that search is 
represented in works of fiction by Henry James, Marcel 
Proust, Samuel Beckett, Charles Dickens and Ann Beattie. 
Nussbaum does not argue that any work of fiction can lead 
us to a deeper understanding of how to live: "the claim is," 
she says, "that only the style of a certain sort of narrative 
artist ... can adequately state certain important truths 
about the world ... " (6). James, in particular, holds 
Nussbaum's attention; his works form the object of three of 
the essays of Love's Knowledge, and his works of fiction and 
his writings on the role of the novelist appear throughout 
the collection. If Nussbaum spends much time exploring 
the moral dilemmas, the internal debates, the dance of 
relationship among the characters of James's work, it is in 
part because of the sympathy in their ideas; both hold that, 
as Nussbaum puts it, "fine attention and good deliberation 
require a highly complex, nuanced perception of, and 
emotional response to, the concrete features of one's own 
context" (7). But beyond this, there is a particular fit 
between theJamesian form and the content, the nature, of 
the Aristotelan search that Nussbaum describes. There is 
something in James's prose, says Nussbaum, that "unfold[s] 
before us the richness of its reflection" (141), that shows 
the "bewildering complexity" of moral choice (142), that 
"convey[s] the active adventure of the deliberative 
intelligence" (142). She describes his prose as 
"linguistically fine-tuned" and "metaphorically resourceful" 
(157), speaks of the "sheer difficulty of James's later style" 
(as exemplified in The Golden Bowl ) , which creates 
"consciousness of our own flaws and blind spots" (144). I 
would like to explore in more depth how it is that James 
constructs a form-a style-that embodies this rich and 
sensitive search for moral truth and meaning. 
A study of style is more than a list of techniques used 
by an author. At its best, stylistic commentary works in 
context, showing the inseparability of form and content in 
a particular passage or a particular work. Stylistic 
commentary should, indeed, itself be "finely aware" as it 
helps the reader to a richer understanding of a text. The 
study of style that I undertake here builds on Nussbaum's 
discussion of The Golden Bowl. The book's focus, of course, 
is the relationships among the rich American industrialist 
and art collector Adam Verver, his daughter Maggie, and 
their respective spouses, Charlotte (a friend of Maggie's) 
and the Italian prince Amerigo. In the passage under 
consideration here, Maggie has just discovered that her 
husband and Charlotte had been lovers before either of 
the two was married. Nussbaum's study of the characters' 
moral compass--how they judge what is right and wrong, 
and therefore how to act-shows that Maggie has always, 
heretofore, judged according to rules, logic, intellect: her 
moral world has consisted of air-tight compartments that 
did not admit flexibility. This "simple" view of the world is 
beginning to change, just as the golden bowl with the 
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hidden flaw-which Charlotte had considered, but 
rejected, as a wedding gift for Maggie and Amerigo-has 
been broken. Here, Maggie and Amerigo are alone 
together for the first time since Maggie has discovered the 
truth about his past. Maggie begins to realize that her 
reactions to this complex world of human relationships 
must becume more flexible. 
Amerigo, meanwhile, after all, could clearly make the most of her 
having enjoined on him to wait-suggested it by the positive 
pomp of her dealings with the smashed cup; to wait, that is, till 
she should pronounce as Mrs. Assingham had promised for her. 
This delay, again, certainly tested her presence of mind-though 
that strain was not what presently made her speak. Keep her eyes, 
for the time, from her husband's as she might, she soon found 
herself much more drivingly conscious of the strain on his own 
wiL There was even a minute, when her back was turned to him, 
during which she knew once more the strangeness of her desire 
to spare him, a strangeness that had already, fifty times, brushed 
her, in the depth of her trouble, as with the wild wing of some 
bird of the air who might blindly have swooped for an instant into 
the shaft of a well, darkening there by his momentary flutter the 
far-off round of sky. It was extraordinary, this quality in the taste 
of her wrong which made her completed sense of it seem rather 
to soften than to harden, and it was the more extraordinary the 
more she had to recognize it; for what it came to was that, seeing 
herself finally sure, knowing everything, having the fact, in all its 
abomination, so utterly before her that there was nothing else to 
add-what it came to was that, merely by being with him there in 
silence, she felt, within her, the sudden split between conviction 
and action. They had begun to cease, on the spot, surprisingly, to 
be connected; conviction, that is, budged no inch, only planting 
its feet the more firmly in the soil-but action began to hover like 
some lighter and larger, but easier form, excited by its very power 
to keep above ground. It would be free, it would be independent, 
it would go in-wouldn't it?-for some prodigious and superior 
adventure of its own. What would condemn it, so to speak, to the 
responsibility of freedom-this glimmered on Maggie even now-
was the possibility, richer with every lapsing moment, that her 
husband would have, on the whole question, a new need of her, a 
need which was in fact being born between them in these very 
seconds. It struck her truly as so new that he would indeed, 
absolutely, by this circumstance, be reaUy needing her for the first 
time in their whole connection ... . 
(The Golden Bow~ Book Second, Chapter XXXIV) 
How does James's style represent, even embody, the 
way in which Maggie approaches this new beginning of 
moral understanding, and the kind of understanding that 
she is learning about, an understanding characterized by 
nuance, sensitivity to context, caring for emotion? I would 
like to discuss briefly several of the techniques that James 
uses in this paragraph, and then show how those 
techniques work together to build what is perhaps the 
central sentence of the passage, the sentence in which 
Maggie feels for the first time the beginnings of change in 
her understanding of moral truth. 
A listing of the stylistic devices used by James in this 
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passage would include the following: repetitiOn of 
vocabulary and of syntactic forms; the placement of 
elements like adverbs or prepositional phrases in such a 
way as to "interrupt" a sentence's syntactic flow; the use of 
deictics (words such as "it" or "this," whose meaning resides 
in the word or words for which they are standing in) whose 
referent appears after the deictic rather than before it; and 
the juxtaposition of abstract vocabulary with concrete 
vocabulary. An example of each of these techniques in the 
passage under consideration will help us to understand 
how James is constructing a rich and nuanced context for 
Maggie's discovery. 
The first instance of repetition occurs in the opening 
sentence of the passage: "Amerigo ... could clearly make 
the most of her having enjoined on him to wait-suggested 
it by the positive pomp ... ; to wait, that is, till she should .. 
.. " The repetition serves several functions here. It works 
as a sort of syntactic signpost: after the explanatory phrase 
"suggested it by the pomp of her dealing with the smashed 
cup," which tells us how Amerigo knew she had "told" him 
to wait, the reader's attention is brought back to this verb 
and then led onward as we discover for what Amerigo is to 
wait ("till she should pronounce ... "). After the 
explanatory "digression," we are led back to the point. 
Repetition also places extra emphasis on the verb "to wait," 
whose meaning is echoed in the first words of the following 
sentence: "This delay." We will see that waiting is in fact 
crucial just now for Maggie: she is aware of her husband's 
presence and of the change in their relationship that is at 
that moment taking place, and she needs time to let the 
change unfold in her. Further on in the paragraph James 
repeats the word "strangeness": " ... the strangeness of her 
desire to spare him, a strangeness that had already . ... " 
Again, its repetition draws attention to this word; it 
underlines Maggie's consciousness that she is reacting in a 
way she would not have reacted before: with "a desire to 
spare [her husband]." The second occurrence of the word 
"strangeness" serves as the springboard for a long and 
complex image that equates this "strangeness" with "the 
wild wing of some bird" whose flutter darkens the sky for a 
moment. Repetition thus makes possible amplification, 
giving the reader a richer understanding of Maggie's 
feeling of strangeness, and deeper insight into her state of 
mind. 
One of the most vivid impressions that I have on 
reading James is that his sentences are constantly interrupted 
by words and phrases that comment, clarify, or qualify in 
some way. Often, these "interruptions" are set off by 
commas, affecting the sentence's pace and rhythm: 
"Amerigo, meanwhile, after all, could clearly make ... "; "to 
wait, that is, till ... "; "This delay, again, certainly tested .. 
.";"Keep her eyes, for the time, from her husband ... "; "A 
strangeness that had already, fifty times, brushed her, in 
the depth of her trouble .... " The "interruptions" 
frequently work on the level of the narrative-the telling of 
the story-to guide the reader in some way: "that is" lets 
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the reader know that an explanation of sorts is to follow; 
"again" points out that in speaking of "delay," the author is 
picking up the theme of waiting previously explored. 
Thus, the author shows us the relationships between 
different parts of the text. Other "interruptions" add 
information, as in "A strangeness that had already, fifty 
times, brushed her .... " The phrase "fifty times" here tells 
us of the pervasiveness of the "strangeness" Maggie feels: 
the separation of the auxiliary verb and its past participle 
("had ... brushed") by this phrase, with the fact that it is 
set it off by commas, breaks up the sentence's rhythm and 
highlights the phrase, leading us to see the intensity and 
the importance of this new feeling for Maggie. This 
frequent "interruption" in James's sentences is a device by 
which James weaves a more complete and more complex 
textual fabric, allowing us to experience with his characters 
the difficulties and the hesitations of life, obliging us to 
recognize relationships within the text. As with James's 
text, so with life: reading demands, as does the working-
through of issues of moral truth, careful attention, concern 
for qualification and nuance. We cannot plunge straight 
ahead through James's text any more than we should 
plunge straight ahead through life's moral dilemmas. 
This last image-Maggie feeling that the strangeness 
of her desire to spare her husband is like a bird darkening 
the sky-is an example of the juxtaposition of concrete and 
abstract that occurs in this paragraph, and throughout The 
Golden Bowl. What Maggie is feeling, the change taking 
place in her, her search for moral rightness, exists on an 
abstract level; this abstraction is, however, presented by way 
of a concrete image ("the wild wing of some bird ... "). In 
the same way, in the following sentence, the "split between 
conviction and action," the new moral complexity of which 
Maggie is becoming aware, is also expressed in concrete 
images: conviction "plant[ed] its feet the more firmly in 
the soil," while "action began to hover. ... " The 
juxtaposition of concrete and abstract calls on the reader 
to imagine conviction with feet, to imagine action as 
hovering, helping the reader to understand better, I 
believe, the change taking place in Maggie. Encountering 
and trying to understand these images, the reader is 
involved in "an activity of exploration and unraveling that 
uses abilities ... of emotion and imagination," as 
Nussbaum puts it-abilities "rarely tapped by philosophical 
texts" (143) but that are necessary here. 
All of these techniques-repetition, "interruption," 
and juxtaposition of abstract and concrete-join with the 
fourth technique mentioned above-use of deictics-in 
what I see as the central sentence of this passage of The 
Golden Bowl, in the sentence beginning "It was 
extraordinary, this quality in the taste of her wrong .... " It 
13 
is here that Maggie's watertight moral compartments begin 
to break apart, just as the golden bowl has broken. From 
the beginning of the sentence, James is building tension, 
creating a complex and nuanced situation, communicating 
to the reader just how crucial this "sudden split between 
conviction and action" really is. 
The sentence opens with a deictic pronoun: "It was 
extraordinary, this .... " Often, the reader knows to what a 
deictic is referring, because that thing has already been 
mentioned. Further in this passage, for example, is the 
phrase " ... action began to hover ... , excited by its very 
power .... " But here, we must wait to find out the identity 
of "it," to discover what is "extraordinary," until the end of 
the long clause that follows. "It was extraordinary, ... this 
quality in the taste of her wrong which made her 
completed sense of it seem rather to soften than to 
harden." The opening phrase, "it was extraordinary," is 
then repeated and intensified-"it was the more 
extraordinary"-as we read of Maggie's having "to 
recognize" her feeling. The same delay in the 
identification of a deictic's referent occurs, further in the 
sentence, in the phrase "what it came to was that .... " 
The reader waits to find out just what it came to--in other 
words, to find out just what the crucial meaning of this 
situation is. 
Several things are accomplished by this stylistic 
device. First, James is able to highlight the adjective 
"extraordinary" by placing it at the end of the short 
introductory phrase, and later repeating that phrase. 
Second, James creates tension by delaying the 
identification of the deictic's reference. This is particularly 
true for our second phrase, "what it came to was that . .. . " 
James first suspends its completion by adding a phrase that 
clarifies for the reader Maggie's state of mind-"seeing 
herself finally sure, knowing everything, having the fact, ... 
so utterly before her .... " Then, after repeating the 
phrase "what it came to was that ... , " both to get the 
reader back on track and to highlight the importance of 
this phrase, James again suspends its completion by putting 
in an "interruption "-the phrase "merely by being with 
him there in silence." James has thus spun out the 
sentence, continually increasing its tension. The release of 
that tension comes at last in the important final phrase, 
"she felt, within her, the sudden split between conviction 
and action." Here, indeed, is the crux of the matter. 
Maggie's formerly compartmentalized moral world will no 
longer dictate to her what action she must take: conviction 
and action have split 
Why has it taken James so long to get to this? Partly, 
of course, the final phrase has gained in rhetorical strength 
through the accumulation of tension throughout such a 
long and complex sentence. It is also true, however, that 
James has needed to set the stage for this statement: the 
reader must understand the full context in which Maggie is 
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functioning, to understand the suddenness and the 
importance of what she is experiencing. The series of 
participial phrases, "seeing ... , " "knowing ... , " "having .. 
. , "stresses the certainty of Maggie's knowledge, a certainty 
which would, before, have pushed her automatically to a 
certain judgment and certain actions. But that is not the 
case any more: a final participial phrase, "being with him," 
prefaced by the adverb "merely," contrasts with the 
previous group, pointing the way to the change in Maggie's 
moral judgment. As Nussbaum points out, Maggie is 
learning that she must be like an actress improvising her 
role: her responses must be sensitive to situation, must 
"rather ... soften than ... harden." She has recognized 
for the first time the "responsibility of freedom" that she 
has, in choosing how to judge, how to act, how to live. 
The sentences that follow build on this image of a 
split, and echo the metaphor of a bird in flight, describing 
action beginning "to hover, like some lighter and larger, 
but easier form, excited by its very power to keep above 
ground." Again, James makes this abstract concept clearer 
by use of a concrete image. This hovering, this beginning 
of flight, also implies a new freedom: "it would be free, it 
would be independent, it would go in-wouldn't it?-for 
some prodigious and superior adventure of its own." We 
note in this sentence yet another "interruption," the 
interjection "wouldn't it?" The function of this phrase is 
not so much to guide the reader in the text, as other 
"interruptions" do, but to allow the reader to follow 
Maggie's thinking as she works through these new ideas. 
We listen as she reassures herself that the split between 
conviction and action really does result in freedom, and, 
further, in a "responsibility of freedom." Thus does the 
text take us along with Maggie even as her learning takes 
place. 
Why, then, is James's prose so fitting for this kind of 
journey toward moral truth? It makes room for revision or 
addition; without being in any way improvised itself, it 
facilitates the expression of improvisation, the 
incorporation of new knowledge into understanding. 
Through repetition and qualification it includes nuance 
and refinement of ideas; its complexity defies shallow 
attempts at facile understanding. And finally, its rhythms 
and tensions enlist our emotions and its images call on our 
imagination as aids in comprehension. Thus equipped, we 
can follow the characters in their moral adventure, 
learning as they learn. 
Nussbaum's arguments for the inclusion of texts of 
narrative fiction in serious philosophical discussion are 
rich, insightful, and, for me, convincing. She is part of the 
growing movement of writers in many disciplines who 
argue that it is time to move away from the idea that 
traditional impersonal expository prose is the only style 
acceptable for "serious" academic writing. Such writers 
would like academic writing to be open to more sources of 
knowledge, including personal experience and emotion 
(again, Nussbaum's argument in favor of emotion as a 
legitimate source of philosophical knowledge supports 
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this), and would like academic writing to be free to dra~ 
on more kinds ofwritten expression. (I thinkjohn Ruffs 
responses, in the form of poems, to our reading and 
discussion in the Colloquium are examples of just this kind 
of freedom.) It is not surprising, then, to realize that, in 
her introduction to Love's Knowledge, Nussbaum writes of 
her personal journey toward this philosophical/literary 
project. Her intellectual and personal relationships with 
novels and with philosophy have much to do with her 
belief in this project, and she does not hesitate to include 
her own narrative of her growing attention to the ideas that 
are explored in this book. 
Finally, it is not surprising either to read Nussbaum's 
own effort at fusing narrative fiction and philosophical 
discussion, in her essay "Love and the Individual: 
Romantic Rightness and Platonic Inspiration" (Chapter 13 
of Love's Knowledge). Here, she combines "A Story," the 
narrative of an unnamed woman reflecting on love and her 
own experience of it, with ordered philosophical 
reasoning, arguments and counterarguments. The essay's 
narrator says, "What I am after, it seems, is a 
noncontrolling art of writing that will leave the writer more 
receptive to love than before" ( 321). She is trying, also, to 
help readers come to an understanding of this topic by 
using all of their capacities of understanding-intellectual 
and emotional. The reader comes to understand the 
question under discussion here both by feeling with the 
story's narrator, and by following intellectually the essay's 
philosophical arguments. As it expresses the inseparability 
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of emotional and intellectual knowledge, as it places the 
discussion of love in a specific context, the prose style of 
this essay is, in many places, distinctly Jamesian-including 
complex sentences with repetitions and "interruptions" 
that qualifY and give nuance, words that remind the reader 
of the text's internal connections, and juxtapositions of 
concrete and abstract. 
I believe that the growing discussion regarding what 
kind of form is appropriate for what kind of content is an 
important one, one that we must take seriously, one that 
merits more attention than I have paid to it here. 
Nussbaum has given us a sensitive and cogent argument in 
favor of openness in this regard: in both her 
"experimental" essay and her more "traditional" (in form, 
at least) philosophical/literary essays, she demonstrates 
how much richer and deeper our understanding can be if 
we are willing to listen to and learn from different ways of 
telling stories. 0 
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The sycamores in Turley's Woods are wet 
and give no hint of color that they had 
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a few days past when looking made you sad 
with aching joy, knowing nature let 
you find the trees in autumn red and gold 
on just this day, or in the amber light 
of dusk when oaks and maples shake their bright 
slender branches in the blowing cold. 
But farms and fields are locked in ice tonight. 
The sheep are white and small as puffs of breath 
and all the world is cold and still as death 
beneath the winter moon whose pale light 
uncovers frozen ponds and woods and weaves 
the shadows of the clouds upon the leaves. 
J. T. Ledbetter 
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From the Chapel 
CHRIST THE KING 
In my sermon two weeks ago I mentioned that one 
indication of the problems facing our nation was the loss of 
a common moral vocabulary. I said that we were losing a 
common language for right and wrong, for good and bad, 
and that the tradition of using biblical references as part of 
that moral vocabulary was in decline. 
Before I left the house that morning I saw in the 
Sunday paper a story that many of you also saw and that 
one of you discovered had also made The New York Times. It 
seems that our District Attorney had had a death sentence 
against a convicted murderer overturned in the Supreme 
Court of the Commonwealth because he had dared to 
quote the Bible in his effort to convince the jurors that 
such a sentence was appropriate. 
Now there are, I'm sure, a host of technical legal 
reasons for the action of the Supreme Court justice. But 
it's still an astounding story of the lengths to which we have 
gone to preserve our moral vocabulary and our public life 
from the taint of religion. 
Had the D.A., for instance, quoted Joseph Stalin or, 
for that matter, the Buddha, it is unlikely that he would 
have lost this appeal. Curiously, the oath administered in 
the York County Court that convicted him reads as follows: 
"Do you swear by Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts, 
that you will true answers make to all questions asked you 
by the court touching the matter now before it-and that 
as you shall answer to God at the last great day." If such 
language is a problem, I wonder that any convictions 
obtained across the alley could withstand the scrutiny of a 
higher court! To be sure, that oath is quaint and archaic, 
Leonard Klein is senior pastor of Christ Lutheran Church in 
York, Pennsylvania, and the husband of historian Christa 
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November of 1991, but we believe that its importance is 
undiminished as Election '92 draws near. 
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but is solemn and religious. I've been called to the witness 
stand a few times, and, believe me, that oath gets your 
attention. 
While we should not insist on keeping that oath or on 
any of a host of misguided efforts to make our secular state 
seem more Christian or just more religious, we ought to be 
outraged by the ideas and trends behind the notion that 
religion and in particular the majority Christian religion of 
America needs to be sealed off from important public 
issues. What is disturbing about the reports on the D.A.'s 
defeat in Harrisburg is not that a death sentence was 
overturned. Christians can have different opinions about 
the wisdom of the death penalty. What is disturbing is the 
notion that a quote from the Bible automatically tainted 
the process. And that it tainted it so severely that the 
sentence had to be overturned. 
It is important for us Christians in America to 
understand some of the thinking behind the developments 
that have brought us to this point. We all know that the 
First Amendment to the Constitution bars the 
establishment of any religion as the faith of this society. 
Few thoughtful Christians have ever quarrelled with that 
solution to the wide variety of faith and thought in our 
country. What is sometimes forgotten is that the First 
Amendment in protecting the free exercise of religion 
anticipates that religion will play a lively role in shaping the 
society. The government is forbidden to establish any 
church just so that the varying religious groups will be able 
to play their full part in shaping both private and public 
life. In spite of their own unorthodox religious views, the 
founding fathers were very much of a mind that without 
religious backing the morals, laws, rights and freedoms of 
the new nation would be on very shaky ground indeed. 
As the years have passed, however, Thomas jefferson's 
understanding that there should be a high wall of 
separation between church and state has gained increasing 
prominence. Now for some quarters of our society-
including many prominent legal thinkers, media gurus, 
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and civil libertarians--the wall can never be high enough 
or thick enough to protect our rights and traditions from 
the dangerous influence of religion. 
So, ifwe are going to be faithful disciples and faithful 
citizens at the same time, we need to try to figure out what 
is going on here and why. We are plainly dealing with 
more than an abstract legal theory. We are dealing with 
small but powerful elite groups who find the prospect of 
religious impact upon our laws, our culture, and our 
morals to be an enormous threat. We are confronted by 
people who genuinely believe that their liberties, their 
values, their very identities are threatened by us. Some are 
flat out anti-religious like Ted Turner, who boasts of how 
much he has grown since repudiating his Southern Baptist 
background. 
Most of us do not see ourselves as a threat to the 
liberties we enjoy. Nor do we see why a religious idea-
like, say, thou shalt not kill-embodied in the law is 
dangerous simply because it's religious. Yet the Gospel, the 
Bible, the Christian Church and its doctrinal and moral 
teaching are profoundly threatening to a significant 
minority of Americans. Why? 
At least in part it is because of the image that 
dominates this liturgy for the last Sunday of the Church 
year-the assertion that the world has a King. Pilate didn't 
want any King of the Jews around, and many our 
contemporaries want no such king either. 
But the world we are told today has a king. We are 
not told that the Church has a King or that the people of 
Israel have a king. Or that you or I have a King. The world 
has a King. 
"The Lord is King; he has put on splendid apparel," 
proclaims the psalm for this day. 
The world is ruled. We are not so independent as we 
would like to think. 
The ruler of this world is not the independent, self-
governed individual. The ruler of this world is the Lord of 
Israel, the Ancient One of our Old Testament Lesson, who 
governs through "one like a human being," a son of man. 
The world is not defined by our heroic efforts. The 
world is defined by the one who, according to our Second 
Lesson is "the Alpha and the Omega," whose Son is the 
ruler and judge of the world. 
That's what we say. If we are to stick by it faithfully, 
some people will take offense. They will look upon us as 
slightly daffy at best, if not downright dangerous. It is very 
possible that those who struggle so furiously against the 
influence of religion in public life are taking the Gospel 
more seriously than we are. 
For, you see, if this world has a king, then you and I 
are not kings, not masters and lords of our own destinies. 
That assertion is troubling for all human beings. And in 
America there is no myth more powerful than the belief in 
our absolute freedom and independence. We fought a 
revolution against a king and we will have no one over us. 
Like all myths this one is a little mushy around the edges. 
We follow the British royal family's ups and downs, and 
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right here in the city that likes to call itself the first capital 
of the American Republic (because the Articles of 
Confederation were signed here) this, the oldest of its 
churches, fronts on King and George Streets. But the 
myth is powerful. 
No one shall rule us. Our hearts, our minds, our lives 
are our own. Such is the ruling myth of America, and so 
our claims for Christ the King and our assertion of the 
eternal reign of his Father are threatening and troubling. 
The Commandments of God are offensive because 
they are, after all, commandments rather than suggestions 
or requests. And the notion of a future judgment, even 
though it is exercised by the crucified Lover of humanity, is 
repellent to those who insist on being their own sole moral 
compass. 
But if God's Law and judgment are potentially 
offensive, so also is the Gospel. For the very word that we 
have, Savior, that we have been forgiven, can be heard as 
an insult by those who believe that they can and should be 
the ones to forgive and save themselves. 
We believe that we have heard a good and loving 
word from the Eternal God, who comes from outside us to 
free us from sin, death, and evil-and from ourselves. But 
for those who do not or cannot share this faith, our faith 
can be both weird and threatening. 
For a world that has declared itself utterly 
independent has no use for a King, not even one who rules 
from a cross. 
We must recognize this. We must be aware that 
Christianity does irritate some people. While it may be the 
televangelists who get the bad press, don't think for a 
minute that we mainstream types cannot also give offense. 
We must recognize the very important and exciting 
reality that the Church in the United States for all its size, 
wealth and prominence is in a missionary situation in a 
society that is increasingly ignorant of or hostile to the 
good news of Jesus Christ. 
We need to know where we stand, and we need to 
recognize our own deep sin-that we are also offended by 
God's claim over us. It has been said that people go to 
church to make their last stand against God. That, I think, 
is unfair, but it's still a danger. It's a danger to us and to 
our mission in the world that we become so at ease with 
our religious life that we forget just how astounding, how 
wonderful and how offensive it is to say that the world has 
as its King a crucified itinerant rabbi who saw himself as the 
means by which God's rule was being initiated. 
There are parts of that message that rub us the wrong 
way too. We are not always eager either to trust or obey 
him. But by the grace of God and the power of his Holy 
Spirit, we are able call him our matchless King. 
And that is good news. For if this world has no King 
and no Judge, it has no future and no hope. If this world 
has no Savior, it has no hope of salvation at all. To those 
who wish to be liberated from all outside authority and 
rule, we can only say that it is good, not bad, to have such a 
king. The various liberations and freedoms that people 
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think they have achieved will turn out to be tyrants, rulers 
and kings of the worst sort. The freedom from God and 
neighbor that is so widely celebrated today is nothing but 
dreadful slavery- to the self, to the moment, to all sorts of 
folly. 
But the crucified Messiah does not enslave us. Our 
Baptism does not enchain us. The Holy Spirit does not 
brainwash us; the Spirit liberates us--to be grateful to God, 
to love our neighbors. And what's more God gives us back 
ourselves. Our revolt does not free us; it enslaves and 
destroys us. 
For no feature of our revolt against God is more 
conspicuous than this--when we reject God, we reject our 
neighbor too and become isolated. Indeed, we imagine 
that isolation is good for us. It's only true if it comes from 
me. I'm only real and authentic to the degree that I 
determine my own course by myself. 
But that's not true. You cannot be human alone. I 
cannot be myself without you. Nor you without me. Too 
many people imagine that human beings are like an onion 
and that to get to the real thing you need to keep peeling 
back the layers. The only problem with that is that when 
you've peeled back all the layers there's nothing left. Take 
away your history, your family, your context, your 
background, language and morals, and all the 
communities and institutions that made you what you are 
and you won't find the real you. You'll find nothing at all. 
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We are not onions and we are not gods. We are 
creatures who have a loving Creator. We were created not 
for splendid isolation, for freedom from God and from our 
brothers and sisters. We were created for the Kingdom, 
the completed and final Community, of God. In the word 
of the magnificent eight hundred year old hymn we are 
about to sing-we were created for the "social joys" of a 
new creation and for the splendid praise of the halls of 
Zion, "con jubilant with song." 
None of this is to say for even a moment that the 
political freedoms and human rights of modern times are 
to be discarded. These are gifts of God that give us the 
opportunity to express and live in the kind of community 
to which he calls the human race. And the misguided 
notions of many of our neighbors don't mean that we are 
to turn on them with sectarian hatred. We are missionaries 
to modern people who have lost their way and sold their 
hope for a bundle oflies and false freedoms. 
But we have a King. And we should not be afraid to 
say so. He has honored us by making us a Kingdom of 
priests. In our Baptism we have been anointed to live and 
rule with him. We are the ambassadors to this world of a 
Kingdom that is not from this world. We anticipate his rule 
even now as we praise him. And we await his Holy Spirit-
in the hope that we might be as excited by the Good News 
of his love as are those who feel threatened by it. 0 
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Points of Light 
Charles Vandersee 
Dear Editor: 
Moebie had raised precisely the 
issue I least wanted to revisit. "Since 
you ask," I said to her, "it felt 
something like slow suffocation by 
toxic fumes." 
"As if I was in this big room," I 
went on, "and exhaust from a bunch 
of big buses kept coming in. My mind 
started getting wobbly, and all these 
voices ebbed and flowed, foaming with 
insincerity. Day after day the voices 
got more and more turgid, and various 
expressions kept coalescing, and I felt 
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I was being plunged from reality." 
"And then at the end," I said, "it 
was like a hallucination. I was awash in 
blue balloons, and red and white ones, 
and-" 
"Some of them as big as dinosaurs' 
testicles," said Moebie. "That was what 
popped into my head." "And of 
course," she said, "that was close to the 
effect intended. The American public 
awash in a turbulent sea of sperm, 
there in the Astrodome. Symbol of 
new birth, fecundity, primal energy, a 
virile new attack on all the nation's 
people." 
"Attack on the nation's problems," 
you mean. I pointed out her 
miniblunder, and she nodded 
unreddening. Freudian slips are not 
what they used to be. I myself had felt 
wearied and inattentive, since that last 
turbulent Houston midnight. A bad 
way to start the new school year. "It 
took me a week," I said, "of vigorous 
aerobic activity to dissipate some of the 
fumes. Newspapers I put aside 
unread." 
"You didn't really," rejoined 
Moebie, knowing all too well my 
unanchoritic disposition. "You kept 
on reading the pontifications, even the 
sidebars and stats, helplessly awash in 
the quadrennial tide." 
This was an unusual flight of 
rhetoric for Moebie, who takes pride 
in expressing herself with what used to 
be called masculine force. It seemed 
the fumes had affected her too. I grew 
rigid, suddenly, with the premonition 
that she would strike out through the 
foamy tide toward the swollen piece of 
jetsam called Family Values. I did not 
want to join her in clambering over 
this jerry-built, tar-coated floating 
signifier. 
"I suppose," she said, "it was no 
better and no worse than the 
Democratic convention, since both 
parties are past masters of posturing 
and pot-calling." Moebie had missed 
part of the Houston proceedings, and 
all of the New York ones, having been 
shuttling between Portsmouth and 
Nepenthe, here in Virginia, combining 
field work with family feuding. I 
myself had missed the Democrats in 
New York, trying to prepare unsullied 
for vacation. 
"This one was better, I'm 
convinced," I said. "The cogent 
analyses of the dynamics of our inner 
cities, with large-scale new initiatives, 
presented by Marilyn Quayle and the 
Bush grandchildren. The conciliatory 
and penitent gestures toward 
marginalized people of all kinds, from 
the hitherto pugnacious and divisive 
Patrick Buchanan." 
"I must have missed all that, and 
didn't see it reported," said Moebie, 
after a long suspicious pause. 
I asked what she had been reading, 
and she replied with an impressive list 
of daily and weekly sources. I 
shrugged the conventional male 
shrug, the God-given gesture 
conveying to women that no matter 
how much they find out, men always 
have found out one thing more. 
This gesture probably would have 
provoked Moebie to seething 
emotional violence, the female 
prerogative, except for the lingering 
Astrofumes. "What I think I will 
remember for a long time," said 
Moebie instead, "was the one moment 
that Mr. Bush positively glowed." "As 
if," she went on, "he were one of his 
own points of light." 
I couldn't think what instant she 
meant. He had seemed, several times, 
on the verge of physical violence, with 
a sort of torch behind each eye, that 
used to be called feminine, but when 
had he been gently luminous rather 
than lurid? 
"Was it," I inquired, "the deeply 
moving moment just after his wife 
Barbara, the grandmother of his 
grandchildren, told of how her 
husband, the President of the Free 
World, was never too busy to tell his 
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granddaughters of his heroic exploits 
in the ocean during World War II, 
exploits sacredly reserved only to 
men?" 
"There was positively a sea change 
in his countenance," Moebie replied, 
rejecting this plausible sally. "The sort 
of change," she went on, "that a film 
director hopes to inspire in every 
phlegmatic Grade B actor and seldom 
does." "It was of course the moment," 
she said, "(perhaps the climax of the 
convention) when he promised the 
American public he would vigorously 
slash aU their capital gains taxes to pieces." 
"He looked," she said, "like a man 
struggling to keep his head above 
water, who suddenly discovers his feet 
touching bottom." "Perhaps," she 
mused, incautiously, "Arthurian. 
Excaliburesque." 
"I must have missed that," I 
confessed, feeling slightly disoriented, 
as if stumbling over Cod in the middle 
of the Pledge of Allegiance. "I was 
awash," I explained," in a sea of old 
newspapers and magazines, piled up 
while on vacation. At the same time I 
was lying on the couch succumbing to 
the air from the Astrodome, I was 
floundering in junk mail." 
"Omaha Steaks International was 
soliciting," I explained, "also Oglala 
Lakota College, also ASH, Action on 
Smoking and Health." "None of 
which," I rued, "I have ever done 
anything for." Moebie's face seemed 
alternately ashen and medium rare. 
"Also," I admitted, "I was drifting 
from time to time back over my travels, 
a sort of instinctive coping mechanism 
in periods of toxiCity and 
watertreading." "My trip took me to 
the unexpected," I explained. "A huge 
recumbent cylinder in downtown 
Oklahoma City," for example, "much 
bigger than even the Banzai Pipeline. 
At one end a rain forest and at the 
other end a desert. You walk up and 
down in this cylinder, and lengthwise 
across by a bridge, and see towering 
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trees and ferns, miniature lizards, a 
waterfall, and a century plant much 
bigger in prickly diameter than any 
dinosaur's testicle." 
All this, the Myriad Gardens Crystal 
Bridge, was perhaps too candid a 
confession, too inadequate a diversion. 
Moebie's eyes looked like convention 
balloons-restless, vacuous or lethal, 
expressions of transience. She takes 
very seriously the major media, the 
events that give rise to the media, the 
aftermath of the media, and the 
various bastard offspring of the 
media-spaced-out crack children, as 
it were--such as C-SPAN. 
"I can't believe," she said 
reproachfully, "that you watched 
without undivided attention. You 
attended to intrusive mail; you 
woolgathered about a garish 
Oklahoma spectacle. You probably 
even ate." 
"I did eat," I reported faithfully, 
having plenished the refrigerator 
immediately on getting back to town. 
"Wonderful local melons," I said, "and 
the new cookie-dough ice cream from 
Flugen- Scheizs." Is that its name? I 
wondered what edibles the Astrodome 
hawkers had proffered Buchanan and 
Cramm. Certainly not chicken salad. 
Perhaps sourdough bread stuffed with 
crab? 
"Food," I explained, "helps me 
concentrate on three or four things at 
once." "Food," I expanded, "is 
empowering." I groped for an 
example. 
"Take William Bennett's head," I 
proposed. "Which, by the way, I had 
never noticed before, is set on his neck 
diagonally, or else it was the camera 
angle." Moebie seethed and 
murmured; being a media user and 
defender, she resents even implied 
criticism of technicians. 
"On the strength of peppermint 
Altoids from Callard & Bowser in York, 
England," I explained, "I could read 
virtually the whole scenario in William 
Bennett's mind. As he kept mouthing 
his ever more flatulent insincerities 
while nominating Danforth Quayle. 
'Plato and Pericles, once,' he was 
inwardly intoning. 'Matthew Arn o ld. 
Tocqueville. Thomas Stearns Eliot. 
Carry Wills, Abraham Lincoln, Edward 
Everett Hale, the dead at Gettysburg.' 
And of course, every few interminable 
moments, 'But what the hell. In 
politics, yagottado what yagottadoo-
doo.'" 
"That," I said, "is my cookie-dough 
reading of a memorable subliminal 
event." "One relishes," I added as a 
coda, "watching a would-be 
philosopher-king awash in the effort to 
breathe timeless universal virtue into a 
pirouetting opportunist and moral 
marionette." 
I could not tell whether Moebie 
was now visualizing a cascade of sperm 
balloons descending in benison on the 
vice-president and against the ample 
teeth of his spouse, or whether an 
atavistic sensation prompted by 
mention of cookie dough had 
momentarily pulled her beneath the 
surface of the present. She looked 
peculiarly drained, as if the re-
experiencing of salient low moments 
of the recent past had put her in need 
of a cold beer commercial. 
"A potatoe for your thoughts," I 
said. 
"I'm thinking," she said, after a 
long tuberous pause, "of October." "It 
was only, after all," she went on, "a 
single event, the convention, in a 
sequence of events. It was only a 
gathering of the faithful, the 
unquizzical, the emergent underdogs, 
the party hacks, the figureheads, the 
Establishment, the hangers-on, the 
manipulators, the mudslingers, the 
sleaze craftspeople." "No doubt," she 
continued, without taking a breath, as 
if afraid to, "the same sort of crowd 
that gathered in New York a few weeks 
earlier." "Although," she said, "I 
suspect the Republicans had more 
balloons, though probably they paid 
smaller wages to the blowers-up." 
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"That would be two differences 
between the two parties," I granted. 
Moebie as a practiced analyst of public 
affairs has a way of getting to one or 
more hearts of the matters, sometimes. 
It is, after all, not the rhetoric and 
posturing that matter, but the 
differences between the two parties. 
"August is not October," she went 
on, sententiously. "And October is not 
November." 
There was her incisiveness. I am as 
appreciative as anyone, when it comes 
to a knife cutting through a sea of 
foam. 
"Anything could happen," I 
asserted, striving to meet the pace she 
was setting. "Toxicity and turbulence 
on the part of both parties could be 
replaced by a sort of neo-Perotvian 
message to the people that the time 
has come for moratoria on greed and 
blaming the criminal." 
Metaphorically, I brushed the water 
out of my eye, as both of us dove and 
surfaced among the Lone Star swells. 
"You mean blaming the victim," she 
nearly cackled. What goes around 
comes around, as Moses allegedly 
heard on Sinai. Moebie craved the 
crisp spearmint taste of revenge. 
"No, really," I insisted. "I thought 
Ross Perot had it in for those of us 
who were out blaming the criminal," I 
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said. "Didn't he want large rooms full 
of people conceding and 
compromising, rooms large enough 
even for people with the least to 
concede, victims even, to make 
generous big efforts?" "That is," I said, 
"a sort of zero-based entitlement event 
in which everybody in the country, 
even those with nothing, came 
together to confess that they had too 
much?" 
Moebie had evidently not read the 
historical little Texan this way, or had 
not had time to, while on the peace 
shuttle for and against her feuding 
family. I shrugged the male shrug, but 
she had averted her eyes. 
"Whatever happens in November, 
we know what happens after 
November," said Moebie, returning 
pithily to the subject at hand. 
Moebie and I are sometimes very 
much on the same wave length, and 
we hurled ourselves out of the 
turbulent water, metaphorically, giving 
each other the high-five: "Business as 
usual!" 
"A nation as awash or more so," I 
added. 
I could sense, though, her 
immediately wanting to repent of this 
shared and triumphalist pre-
November, post-Houston cynicism, 
which seemed to be able to flourish as 
impressively as the tropics in a huge 
tube in middle Oklahoma. Think of 
all the effort it took in both cities, to 
produce the respective results! 
I knew that we were far from the 
end of our discussion, and I did not 
relish the idea of having to induce her 
back into a sort of bleak national 
depression, now that from the edge of 
the pier, metaphorically, she had the 
illusion of seeing a point of green 
light. It was a surprise, therefore, 
when her next comment attempted 
closure on an earlier matter left, for 
her, pending. For me the pending 
issue was the manner of dinosaur 
procreation-not mammalian, with 
discernible external genitalia, I would 
have guessed, but not having volumes 
of the National Geographic on disk on 
hand. 
"Did you get those melons at 
Giant," she asked, "or at Food Lion, or 
where? Or is it too late?" 
"It's almost always too late, for 
more and more things," I heard myself 
saying, succeeding in not shrugging, 
but not by much. 





Its Diagnosis and 
Treatment 
Albert R. Trost 
The United States is in a period 
of malaise. In fact, it is an extended 
period, dating at least from the Fall of 
1991. This column is certainly not the 
first, nor will it be the last place where 
attention is called to our national 
condition of feeling bad. So many 
have commented on the feeling of 
malaise, that the comment itself is a 
cause of the feeling. The feeling 
seems to be associated with the 
concurrent decline in the popularity 
and the approval rating for President 
Bush. It comes after several months of 
euphoria over our adventure in the 
Gulf. There is no specific scandal or 
crisis associated with the beginning of 
the bad feeling. However, there is no 
lack of symptoms. Major indicators 
include the civil disorder in Los 
Angeles earlier in the year, the trade 
deficit with Japan, the continuing 
specter of urban homelessness, 
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bankruptcies and layoffs, and even 
natural disasters like Hurricane 
Andrew seem to qualify. With every 
symptom, the feeling deepens that 
something is wrong. 
There is a general feeling that 
the "something wrong" has an 
economic dimension. There are a lot 
of articles written on the decline of 
our competitive position in the world. 
The feeling here is that the source of 
our trouble may be external. There is 
also the suggestion by many that the 
problems may have a moral root. The 
decline of "family values" is a 
prominent theme in the present 
presidential campaign. The 
suggestion in this theme is that the 
causes· are internal. Uncertainty about 
America's post-Cold War role in the 
world is a third much-discussed cause, 
a lack of international moral purpose. 
We are like a patient who has 
had a low-grade fever for some time; it 
has not stopped the patient from 
normal functioning, but he does not 
feel well. He goes to the doctor for 
tests and diagnoses. The doctor finds 
ambiguous results from the tests. It is 
obvious that the patient is not feeling 
well and there may be some faint 
suggestions of causes, but nothing 
stands out. The patient is told to rest, 
change his diet, or take aspirin and go 
to bed. The bad feeling persists and 
the patient returns to the doctor. The 
visit has the same result. There is no 
clear diagnosis, and no clear remedy is 
prescribed. The condition of feeling 
bad persists. After a number of visits 
to the doctor with the same results, the 
patient is likely to change doctors. 
The doctor in this tale is 
personified by the President of the 
United States. We feel bad and look to 
our political leadership to at least tell 
us what is wrong, if not also help us to 
remedy our condition. We do not 
seem to get clear answers. Late last 
year, the message seemed to be that 
nothing was really wrong, but the bad 
feeling came from a bunch of "nay-
sayers" positioning themselves for the 
presidential race. Early this year, the 
President and his spokespersons 
seemed to strongly agree that our 
problems were economic and had 
external causes. He went off to East 
Asia to fix the causes and blame (and 
got sick himself in Japan). Lately we 
have heard more about moral 
dimensions to the malaise, and the 
suggestion that a renewed emphasis on 
family values under Republican 
leadership was the remedy. There is 
not much evidence at this writing that 
the President has been vindicated as 
diagnostician, doctor, or political 
leader of the nation. We seem about 
ready to change doctors. 
At this point, the writer of this 
column is also ready to make the 
change. Like much of the rest of the 
public, it is not so much because the 
other candidate, Bill Clinton, is 
believed to have the correct diagnosis, 
or the quick remedy. It is more the 
feeling that we are not making much 
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progress towards feeling better with 
the one we have. Parenthetically, our 
dilemma in finding the right doctor 
might explain the fascination of some 
for the appeal of that purveyor of 
snake remedies, Ross Perot. 
Before many of us rush off to 
change physicians, one more look at 
the malaise and the political 
leadership of George Bush might be in 
order. 
It would grossly overstate the case 
to say that the United States has lost its 
competitive edge in international 
economics. We have lost the edge in 
some product areas like automobiles 
and consumer electronics, but are 
front-runners in computer software, 
biotechnology, aerospace and 
pharmaceuticals. We continue to 
experience negative trade balances, 
though the value and the volume of 
our manufacturing exports continues 
to rise. The productivity of American 
labor remains relatively high and the 
cost relatively low, so that neither 
factor has been responsible for a 
decline in our competitive position. 
The United States remains a strong 
and successful economy. However, 
even though we are the largest 
national economy, others have been 
growing faster. We are not the leader 
in all categories. In some, like 
investment in our own manufacturing 
sector, we are well down the list. 
It is when the comparative 
perspective is dropped, and the only 
comparison that is made is with 
ourselves, that the feeling of malaise 
grows. We are in a recession (though 
others are as well). Real growth in our 
economy under President Bush, 
computed as an annual average, is 
only about a third of what it was under 
Presidents Carter and Reagan. 
Government budget deficits continue 
to grow to record levels, the last two 
years of the Bush administration 
being particularly bad. 
Unemployment has grown in the Bush 
years. It has gone from over 5 percent 
to well over 7 percent. Newspaper 
articles continue to report that more 
are hungry and more are homeless 
than at any time since the Second 
World War. A newspaper article in 
October 1992 
our local paper this very evening 
reports the number of "hungry" in 
America at 30 million. 
It is hard to blame Mr. Bush 
alone for the recession, trade deficits, 
or budget deficits. He has had to 
share decision-making in these areas 
with a Congress, both of whose houses 
have been controlled by Democrats for 
the last four years. Also, most of the 
rest of the industrialized world is also 
experiencing recession. However, as 
The Economist, a British publication 
observed in its January 18, 1992 issue, 
in America, "to an extent that is not 
true of any other country, they look to 
the President for a lead; first in 
honestly admitting that the country 
has hard work ahead of it, and then in 
suggesting what that work might be." 
The Economist concludes in that same 
article, "giving a lead is not Mr. Bush's 
style." 
It is not only in the economic 
maladies where diagnosis, prescription 
and cure are desperately needed. The 
health and education systems are in 
dire need of attention. Neither can be 
fixed simply by more money. This is 
especially true of the already too costly 
health-care system. Structural reforms 
are required. Innovation is required. 
Leadership is needed. 
Perhaps the biggest reason for 
our present malaise is the one most in 
need of basic identification and 
diagnosis. It is at its base a moral 
problem. This is the continuing 
inequity of life conditions among our 
own people. We are a strong and 
successful nation, but a sizable 
minority do not share in this strength 
or success. Across the family income 
spectrum, there continue to be vast 
differences in nutrition, housing, 
health care, and basic education. We 
need, as a nation, to be shown this 
problem, and reminded of our 
responsibilities for it. Cure of these 
maladies, especially this last, is too 
much to ask of one President's time in 
office. 
Can President Bush help us with 
our feeling of malaise in a second 
term? The evidence from his first 
term and his other public positions 
earlier in his career are not 
encouraging. President Bush's 
strengths are his prudence, and his 
ability to consult with others and to 
compromise. He works best in a small 
group. His style was what was needed 
in molding an allied coalition to fight 
in the Gulf (and to win). His 
accomplishments in guiding Western 
response to the demise of the Soviet 
Union (among Western leaders), may 
be his chief claim to later fame. He 
has been patient and prudent in 
bringing Israelis and Arabs together in 
the Middle East (through James 
Baker). He is good at mastering 
complexity, but not in communicating 
the complexity to the American 
people. His analysis of a complex 
domestic problem sounds like waffling 
and indecision. The warmth, 
compassion, and cordiality he has 
been able to convey to leaders of other 
allied nations with whom he works, 
with his close staff and friends, or even 
occasionally with Congressional 
leaders, he has not been able to 
transfer to the American public at 
large. 
We might be able to ride with a 
warm, close family doctor and friend 
for four more years, but George Bush 
has not been the country family doctor 
that maybe his predecessor was to 
many people. He does not inspire that 
kind of trust. Impatient with our lack 
of confidence and trust in him, he has 
occasionally pandered to our baser 
instincts and self-diagnoses. His ill 
advised trip to Japan with our auto 
industry executives in January was such 
a time. He was on the verge of "Japan-
bashing." The use of Willie Horton to 
talk about crime and social problems 
in 1988 was not inspiring. He has 
recently resurrected his "no new taxes" 
prescription again. 
Our doctor has been prudent, 
even conservative, and probably 
competent as he has tried to deal with 
our problems over the last four years. 
But he has not diagnosed or cured our 
general malaise. It may be too deep 
and too complex to be cured. 
However, many are tired of feeling 
listless and down. We will probably try 
another doctor. 0 
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The Player : 
A Postmodern Morality 
Play 
Reinhold Dooley 
In a recent press conference 
Woody Allen defended himself against 
charges of child molestation, and thus 
implicitly defended the morality of his 
affair with Mia Farrow's adopted 
daughter, the child for whom Allen 
acted as father figure for 12 years. 
Framed by the TV screen, this event 
played like an out-take of Manhattan. 
It had the "real life" texture of Zelig. It 
also displayed the metaphysical 
confusion of Purple Rose of Cairo, in 
which a fictional character steps out 
from the film into the real world. As in 
earlier days when Reagan blurred the 
line between Hollywood and reality, 
Allen appeared more like a fictional, 
cinematic character, than a real 
person. 
In this bizarre episode we see a 
blurring of the lines between the 
"actual" historical real and the 
cinematic real and a concomitant 
blurring of distinctions between the 
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moral and immoral. This blurring is 
symptomatic of postmodernism, which 
erases distinctions by undermining all 
absolutes and foundations. 
Specifically, postmodernism 
rejects the linguistic theology which 
assumes a referent or "real" existing 
prior to language. "There is nothing 
outside the text," states Jacques 
Derrida, by which he means, among 
other things, that there is no world or 
reality which we can talk about which 
is not itself a text. There is nothing 
beyond or behind language. Rather 
than directing us to the real, language 
is tropic; it only takes us to more 
language. It keeps us at the surface 
level of meaning because there are no 
depths of meaning to plumb; there is 
nothing below language. Linguistically 
speaking, this means there is no 
foundational meaning to language, 
only the radical plurality and play of 
unresolvable indeterminacies. In 
theological terms there is no 
grounding author or authority who 
underwrites the real or who gives 
authenticity to identity and validity to 
morality. 
It is within this context of 
postmodern theory that Robert 
Altman's latest film, The Player offers 
itself up as a morality play for our 
times. In a variation of Derrida, The 
Player suggests that "there is nothing 
outside the film." It suggests 
(somewhat exaggeratedly, of course) 
that in American culture of which 
Hollywood is a microcosm, there is no 
reality beyond the cinematic, beyond 
the surface of film. There is no reality 
which is not interfused with the 
qualities and values of what I shall call 
the "cinematic reel." (Note: For the 
sake of brevity I conflate all media-
TV, advertising, movies-under the 
rubric of the "cinematic reel.") 
The Allen incident is a 
particularly blatant example of how 
utterly interfused and imbricated 
American culture IS with the 
cinematic. It is necessarily a more 
subtle interweaving of spectacle and 
reality that we find in the general 
population. But it is not my purpose to 
document instances of this cultural 
phenomenon beyond its manifestation 
in Altman's film. (See the work of jean 
Baudrillard who has shown how the 
media has constructed western 
cultural reality by replacing it with an 
imaginary hyperreality.) 
Altman's movie is typical of the 
thriller genre in that it involves 
murder and suspense. But, 
significantly, the murdered person in 
this instance is an author of 
screenplays and his murderer is a 
Hollywood executive who suspects the 
writer of sending anonymous 
threatening postcards. And atypical of 
the genre, the executive, Griffin Mill, 
actually gets away with cold-blooded 
murder. Furthermore, in a 
quintessential "happy ending," he gets 
the dead writer's girl as well. 
The movie is set in Hollywood , 
the epitome of the cinematic reel. As 
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such it crystallizes the theoretical point 
that "there is nothing outside the 
film": the Hollywood which the film is 
supposed to represent is itself already 
film-like. There is a redundancy in 
making a film about Hollywood 
because it is always already all show 
and showpeople. An expose of the 
"real Hollywood" would reveal only 
tinsel behind the tinsel of Tinseltown. 
At one point Mill pleads, "Can't we 
talk about something other than 
Hollywood?" But he immediately 
breaks into resigned laughter: for 
these Hollywood insiders there is 
nothing outside of Hollywood. The 
ever-conspicuous motto of Mill's 
studio reads, "Movies, now more than 
ever." 
Even for those outside the 
business, the Hollywood simulacrum 
supersedes the real. When Mill is 
taken in as a murder suspect, a witness 
notes with amazement that her real-life 
experience of the police lineup is just 
like 1V. It is only the similarity to the 
mediated version of reality which 
makes the event real to her. Her 
experience of reality has been 
constructed by the cinematic reel. 
The difficulty of establishing 
what is truly outside the film, is 
suggested by the desire to use "real" 
people in the movies. When pitching 
his script to Mill, a British screenwriter 
insists on casting "real" people in his 
film Habeas Corpus. His overzealous 
agent surreptitiously interjects the 
name "Bruce Willis" for the lead role. 
The distinction between the real and 
reel fails here. The screenwriter 's 
"real" people are actors, after all; while 
Bruce Willis, though an actor, is 
nonetheless "real." 
Even the cameo appearances 
which seem to point outward toward a 
grounding reality are problematic. 
After seeing cameos of at least 60 stars, 
we are taken aback when we initially 
encounter Whoopi Goldberg holding 
an Oscar in her hand. We mistake her 
for herself when in "actuality" she is a 
police officer interrogating Mill. The 
cameo itself as a device leads us to 
question what it means to act as 
oneself, to play oneself. When Bruce 
Willis finally appears in the Hollywood 
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production of "Habeas Corpus," there 
is some difficulty in "producing the 
body"; for his appearance is a cameo 
of himself playing himself as his 
persona playing a character in a 
movie. As Altman's title suggests, in 
the real and the cinematic reel, 
everyone is a player. 
Of course, no one is more of a 
player in this movie than Griffin Mill. 
Figuratively, he is a player in the 
Hollywood game of power and 
prestige. Throughout the film he plays 
his social role scrupulously: he dresses 
the part, drives the proper car, drinks 
the appropriate designer waters from 
correct glassware. As the movie 
progresses he very convincingly acts 
the part of an innocent man. However, 
he is also a player in a literal sense in 
that he is an actor in a film. In the 
opening shot of The Player, as credits 
roll, we view a scene marker which 
states "Scene 1, take 10." The film is 
actually a movie within a movie. At the 
conclusion we discover that Mill has 
produced a movie called The Player, 
the very movie we have just watched. 
His life has been grist for his own 
Hollywood mill. He is a player in both 
the real and the reel. This is 
recognized at least twice in the film. 
Imitating a player from the movie 
Freaks, one of the police challenges 
Mill's real status, taunting him with the 
chant "one of us, one of us." Kahane 
too identifies Mill as an unreal player, 
stating, "See you in the next reel." 
Postmodern life, The Player 
reveals, is cinematic. Like the actual 
strip of film, it is all surface, 
transparent, depthless, capable of 
projecting life-like but nonetheless 
insubstantial images. Rather than 
being a convenient vehicle for the 
expression of the real, film, it turns 
out, is itself the real, and the only real 
there is. Nothing authentic underlies 
film or exists beyond film. In the 
postmodern world real people are 
actually players; real things are only 
simulacra, mere representations of an 
imaginary real. 
In postmodern terms, The Player 
establishes that the universe we live in 
is emphatically not "logocentric." 
Derrida describes logocentrism as the 
Western metaphysics which professes 
an ultimate referent, a self-certifying 
absolute foundation beyond the play 
of language which is able to fix 
determinate meanings. Historically, 
God has been acknowledged as the 
Logos, the fixed center and the 
guarantor of the validity of language. 
The postmodern condition 
results from a loss of God as the 
author of the word and the world. In a 
linguistic echo of Nietzsche, it declares 
what Roland Barthes calls the "death 
of the author." Without the author as 
arbiter of a text's meaning (or the 
world's), we are left with a never-
ending proliferation of discrepant 
meanings. We are left with radical 
undecidability as all readings become 
defensible. It is precisely this 
postmodern phenomenon, the death 
of the author and its resulting anarchy, 
that is enacted in Altman's morality 
play. 
The desire for independence 
from the author is expressed by Larry 
Levy, a studio executive vying for Mill's 
position. He argues that screenwriters 
are too expensive, he questions their 
creative ability, and suggests that their 
originality is undesirable. He 
denounces them as ultimately 
superfluous. To his rhetorical question 
"Who wrote the ending of Fatal 
Attraction?" he answers "the audience." 
Using an apt religious trope, he rejects 
authors, stating "I never saw a writer 
who could change water to wine." 
Mill, of course, has actually 
enacted this desire for autonomy by 
murdering the screenwriter, Kahane. 
Pursuing Levy's unwitting association 
of the author with THE Author-God, 
we discover that Mill is a diminutive 
version of Lucifer. Thus, within the 
theological and theoretical allegory of 
this morality play Mill has nullified the 
diadic economy of origins/originality, 
author /authority, creator I creativity. 
He has figuratively initiated the 
postrnodern age. 
Furthermore, like the vulturous 
griffin whose name he bears, he preys 
on the dead, usurping the murdered 
writer's lover, June. In an act of 
Freudian rebellion, he reenacts the 
oedipal event, killing the authoritarian 
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father and seducing the mother. As a 
result of these violations he is loosed 
from the law of the father, from 
author and authority. Both he and 
June become their own points of 
origin, radically free to create their 
own world, and to interpret their own 
morality. Mill rightly describes June, 
and himself by extension, as a 
"pragmatic anarchist." They 
rationalize that "If you don't suffer, 
then it wasn't a crime." And Mill 
suffers neither remorse (both he and 
June are described as heartless) nor at 
the hands of the law, because he gets 
away with the murder. In the absence 
of the Author as external, 
transcendent arbiter of morality, there 
is no need for moral discernment. In 
this film, distinctions are made 
between designer waters rather than 
crimes and misdemeanors. 
The final scene depicts a smiling 
Mill hugging his pregnant wife amidst 
a profusion of flowers, in front of their 
mansion, with an American flag 
blowing in the breeze. Is it the 
American dream come true? Is it a 
happy ending? Or is it meant to be 
ironic? In the absence of an author it 
is difficult to tell. But this is a morality 
play I have asserted. And in fact The 
Player resurrects both the author and 
moral authority. The author actually 
never died. As it turns out, Mill 
murdered the wrong writer. The actual 
writer of poison pen letters ultimately 
returns to bl_ackmail Mill. The demand 
is that he produce the movie which the 
blackmailer calls The Player. 
But this is not the true return of 
the author, for the blackmailer's 
power is tentative and does not dismay 
Mill in the least, and rather than 
condemn the "happy" ending, it 
Coming next month in The Cresset ... 
ensures it. Rather, the authentic 
author has been with us the entire 
film. It is Altman himself. He is the 
grounding author, the moral 
authority, who announces himself in 
the opening shot of the film and is an 
abiding and critical presence 
throughout. Altman, who is literally 
introduced in the credits, preserves 
the leader footage with the scene 
marker in it and thus blatantly asserts 
his very real authorial and 
authoritative presence behind the 
camera and throughout the film. It is 
thus his movie which frames Mill's and 
serves as a stinging comment and 
rebuke of Mill, Hollywood, and 
postmodernism. And it is Altman, not 
Mill, who gets the last laugh. Dubbed 
over the picture-perfect ending and 
undercutting its "happiness," we hear 
the ironic and scornful jeer: na-nee na-
nee nah-nah. 0 
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We tried to live your ideas, there in Iowa, 
nonviolence in the corn, 
tried to nourish the vision of a Pella ashram 
tried to find the simple, essential life 
in Happy Joe's. 
You were Ben Kingsley on the screen, 
a warm feeling of peace and understanding 
to us, in a land of simple ideas, 
stubborn stances, fixed vision, 
traditional values. 
How can you spin cotton in a small town, 
how can you go about in a loin cloth, 
we wondered, 
how can you extract salt 
from a freshwater reservoir, 
what's oppression 
where few hold contrary thoughts? 
Brutal shots rang out 
in six-channel Dolby. 
We ordered a medium pepperom, 
a medium taco pizza, 
talked about ignorance destroying humanity, 
considered fasting to open minds, 
imagined our bodies prone before horses, 
stayed out past midnight 
on endless diet coke refills. 
Gandhi-not-medium 
you sample, example, 
of the East 
on that Mid-western screen. 
Mid-mediocrity, bad taste in our mouths, 
we became as perplexed as you, 
the long quiet car ride, 
the good night, good night, 
the see-you-before-the-dishwasher-tomorrow, 
the lonely fall towards sleep, 
the why of the streetlight bleeding in the night, 
sending slivers of where across my sheets. 
Stu Selthun 
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Faith in Many Keys 
Jean Sulivan. Morni"f/5 Light: The 
Spiritual Journal of Jean Sulivan. Trans. 
by Joseph - Cunneen and Patrick 
Gormally. New York: Paulist Press, 
1988. 180 pp. $12.95. 
The Sea Remains. Trans. by 
Robert A. Donahue, Jr. and Joseph 
Cunneen. New York: Crossroad, 1989. 
118 pp. $13.95. 
Last fall, my class and I were 
discussing Mark's story of the rich man 
who followed all the commandments: 
"Jesus, looking at him, loved him and 
said, 'You lack one thing; go sell what 
you own, and give the money to the 
poor, and you will have treasure in 
heaven; then come follow me.' When 
he heard this, he was shocked and 
went away grieving, for he had many 
possessions" (10:21-22). What might 
this mean to thirteen middle-class 
freshmen and their middle-class 
teacher? Well, some of us said, it 
doesn't mean we have to sell what we 
own. We just need to keep ourselves 
from getting too materialistic, and 
keep the poor in mind. One student, 
who spoke infrequently, offering 
something either drolly humorous or 
deeply serious, disagreed. "Too often 
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people water down these words. I 
think he means just what he's saying. 
The challenge he's presenting is real, 
and spoken to us, too." His conviction 
impressed and unsettled us. By 
affirming Jesus' harsh request that we 
give away everything and follow, the 
student reanimated the moment in 
Judea, and its radical challenge. 
Jean Sulivan also attempts to 
reanimate the harsh-and joyful-
words of the Gospel. A French 
Catholic priest, born in 1913 and 
killed in an au to accident in 1980, 
Sulivan lived out his vocation in his 
writing. His work can be located in a 
tradition that includes Charles Peguy, 
Georges Bernanos, and Simone Weil, 
each of whom Sulivan cites. Highly 
regarded in France, most of his twenty-
six books are published by the 
prestigious Gallimard press. As I call 
attention to Sulivan 's prestige, 
however, I run counter to the spirit of 
his voice. In both of his recently 
translated, mutually illuminating 
books-his novel, The Sea Remains, and 
his spiritual journal, Morning Light-
Sulivan sees prestige and power as 
squelching the Gospel's radically 
humble Word: "Jesus' message is the 
opposite of power" (ML 25). In his 
embrace of "the humility of the flesh" 
(ML 97), in the homely Semitic 
images with which he invests his words, 
Jesus affirms the value of our physical 
lives, and the paradoxical authority of 
kenosis, the pouring out of power. 
The Gospel's words call us to 
participate in the process of kenosis in 
our own lives, and its call can shock, 
wound, and grieve. Ultimately it can 
liberate and heal. Sulivan 's own 
words seek to usher in the possibility 
of such an experience in his readers. 
In the first section of Morning 
Light, Sulivan offers deeply felt and 
insightful readings of Mark and John. 
He insists that if we truly wish to hear 
the Gospel's Word, we must release 
the Greek conceptual and Roman 
legalistic traditions surrounding it, and 
embrace its Semitic rootedness: "The 
Gospel emerged from a world of 
peasants and sailors. Jesus is the rabbi 
whose word is transpierced with 
images of trees, water, harvests, cattle , 
shepherds, and vagabonds" (ML 3). 
In allowing concepts to eclipse the 
Gospel's physical, prosaic vitality, we 
run counter to its message of humility; 
our impulse to conceptualize easily 
turns sectarian and imperialistic (ML 
90). To avoid such an impulse, 
Sulivan exhorts us to read and 
experience the Gospel as a poem, for 
"in every poem the revelation is not 
situated only, or primarily in the idea; 
it is not a knowledge. It is born of a 
breathing and rhythm-that is, it is 
conveyed by the body, and not only in 
the mind" (ML 4). In response to this 
revelation, we evince our faith and 
love in our bodies-in our tone of 
voice, our glances, our gestures toward 
others, perhaps in "quietly doing the 
dishes," the image with which Sulivan 
closes Morning Light ( 180). 
Sulivan 's spiritual wisdom is 
grounded in the Incarnation and 
kenosis of Jesus. He thus recognizes 
the Church's need for institutional 
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embodiment. As a character in The Sea 
Remains puts it, "the gospel couldn't be 
delivered to the world in its pure 
essence. If the soul were without a 
body, there would no longer be a soul" 
(24). Yet a tension can emerge 
between Incarnation and kenosis. If 
the Church inhibits the working of the 
Spirit through its body of dogma, or 
confuses spectacle with enspirited 
ritual, it allows power to abolish 
kenosis, and embodiment becomes 
petrification. The Church can easily 
forget its fun dam en tal role as the 
"servant of the Gospel" (ML 27). As 
servant, it ought to "allow the Word to 
make its own way within human 
consciousness" ( ML 92). If in the 
quest for conceptual coherence, it 
attempts "to keep the lid on that 
sparrow-hawk, the Holy Spirit" it 
"yield[s] to the temptation of an 
imperialistic unity" (93). Likewise, if it 
covers itself too snugly with the 
trappings of power and prestige, it 
grows deaf to the Gospel's call to 
poverty. Cardinal Ramon Rimaz, the 
chief character of The Sea Remains, 
reflects on this in a homily: 
Of course he remained convinced 
that the Church needed a firm and 
independent base in order not to dissolve 
in people's consciousness: there were lots 
of examples to demonstrate the illusion of 
those who had wanted to rely solely on 
their inspiration. But little by little, he 
said, he had come to think that the social 
power of the Church could be the cause of 
its spiritual weakness, just as a mass 
membership could go hand in hand with 
profound alienation. The Church itself 
ought to be poor and humble, without 
waiting to be crucified. People were able 
to be poor and humble for themselves, and 
rich and proud for the Church. (100) 
Rimaz utters these words-"as 
discreet as a feather brushing a 
windowpane"- late in the novel, near 
the end of an interior journey through 
humiliation and self-discovery. He is a 
retired Spanish cardinal, living in a 
villa near the sea. In an Augustinian 
search through memory, he recollects 
those moments when the conflict 
between his role as Church leader and 
servant of the Gospel was most clearly 
cast into relief. He remembers his 
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mother stepping into "the immense 
panelled rooms of [his] episcopal 
palace," and asking, stunned, "'How 
can it be? We were ... and you, 
because you . .. Is this what the gospel. 
.. ?'" (44). He recalls the 
authoritative challenge of a young 
Chinese priest: "'Juan Ramon, are you 
a successor of the apostles or the 
director of a corporation?'" (56). 
Now, with "all real power. . . 
withdrawn" (9), he recognizes the 
futilitad of a life founded on external 
reverence and regard as opposed to an 
interior vitality. In anger and 
humiliation, he orders his 
housekeeper to burn - "Quema"-
the ecclesiastical memorabilia she has 
lovingly gathered. 
Here, at his lowest point, his 
interior journey takes a hopeful, 
restorative turn. On long walks along 
the shore, he attends closely to the 
physical reality surrounding him-
water, beach grass, boulders, the faces 
and bodies of other people. As he 
enters into relationship with an 
unlikely array of others-a small child, 
a painter and her imprisoned lover, 
his niece and her Marxist boyfriend, a 
poor fisherman-he emerges from 
solitude. Gradually, he rediscovers his 
deepest self and his vocation: "To his 
endless amazement, by discovering the 
world he entered in to the 
understanding of the gospel" (81). 
Like the Gospels, which are his 
inspiration, Sulivan's work is rich in 
paradox. In The Sea Remains, Rimaz 
must lose his self before he finds 
himself; in his recovery of childhood 
he achieves maturity; in accepting the 
limit of death he discovers his greatest 
joy. In Morning Light, Sulivan avows 
his Gospel-rooted preference for the 
marginal and the powerless, the last 
that shall be first-the rebel, reject, 
and vagabond. But, in his journal, as 
he pokes at the pompous and 
powerful, he veers close to sarcasm 
and judgment. Here paradox can 
deteriorate into binary opposition, and 
become just another assertion of 
power: "There is no hope for someone 
like that," he writes of the person who 
tells others "he's praying, that he's 
been praying, or is about to pray." 
Immediately aware of his objectifying 
self-assertion, however, Sulivan seeks 
paradox and humility in his next 
sentence: "Of course, he might be a 
saint; language is deceptive" (138). 
In The Sea Remains, he 
relinquishes such power in his refusal 
to inscribe its plot with a clear-cut 
authorial preference. The character 
one least suspects, emerges, possibly, 
as most Christ-like: Juan Gonzalez, a 
traditionally pious, rich, right-wing 
landowner. In a remarkable scene-
one which looks ahead to the recent 
film Jesus of Montreal-the powerful 
landowner plays the part of Christ in 
the town's version of the Passion Play. 
"[P]erhaps ... he becomes, by grace, 
humble and poor, one with Him 
under this cross" (113). "[P]erhaps" 
(104) too he inspires the culminating 
kenotic step of Cardinal Rimaz. As 
novelist, Sulivan sustains the radically 
disruptive spirit of paradox. 
Appropriately, Denise Levertov 
has described Sulivan 's novel 
"polyphonic," a word that the Russian 
literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin uses 
to describe Dostoevsky's affirmation of 
"the indepen~dence, internal freedom, 
unfinalizability, and indeterminacy of 
the hero. For the author the hero is 
not 'he' and not 'I' but a fully valid 
'thou' ... " (63). Bakhtin's words can 
be applied to Sulivan. In each of his 
characters, including Gonzalez, 
Sulivan deeply respects "the mystery of 
conscience and ambiguity of human 
actions" (SR, 69). He relinquishes 
authorial omniscience and control 
over them. His authorial "perhaps" 
regarding their motivations suggests a 
position alongside rather than above 
them. Thus, polyphonic creation 
partakes in kenosis. 
Sulivan 's fractured style further 
evinces his relinquishing of tight 
authorial control. Although ultimately 
beautiful in form, The Sea Remains 
often proceeds by hints, ellipses, 
premomtwns, and fragmentary 
images. Although themes recur in 
Morning Light, and the book is rich in 
challenging ideas, he refrains from 
imposing a restrictive coherence or 
"order" (85) upon them. Taking the 
path of Eckhart, Siesius, the Tao, the 
Tch'an, he resists what he calls "the 
dominant thought of the West, which 
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invites us to knowledge, to power, to 
take, to possess" (11). In neither work 
does Sulivan wish us to mentally 
manipulate a system of ideas. He 
invites us, in this instant, to joyfully 
embody the words he offers: "Truths 
for our feet I Truths that can dance" 
(113). 
As a Catholic, I believe that 
Sulivan's words can be salutary to the 
Church today, particularly as it 
responds to the questions of authority 
and ecumenism. Here is Sulivan on 
authority: "The prophet versus the 
worldly leader. We need a form of 
authority-author, one who gives life 
(the author of my days), who increases 
it-a chief if you prefer, but without 
power" (ML 162). I think here of 
Archbishop Weakland of Milwaukee, 
relinquishing his position above, to sit 
with and listen to the women whose 
voices had not been heard. Such 
authority "authors" in that it opens up 
a space for the voice of the other, 
allows it to be heard, and seeks 
decision through attentive dialogue. 
Might such a conception of authority 
be institutionalized? 
As a Catholic teaching at a 
Lutheran university, I am struck by the 
radical similarities in our two 
traditions, and wonder when we will be 
"officially" united. Sulivan also speaks 
briefly about ecumenism: 
The Church exists everywhere there 
are communities that give testimony of 
universal love. Unless language changes-
and it changes only after a spiritual 
revolution---ecumenism will remain what it 
has seemed so far, an administrative 
enterprise, following the laws of 
competition in which, despite the 
vocabulary of good feeling, we always 
detect the prudent search for advantage. 
We don't want to be cynical, but the truth 
is that no one wants to lose his clientele. 
Ecumenism will become truly worldwide 
only by rejecting calculation, through self-
effacemenL (15(}.57) 
For Sulivan, both a revisioning of 
authority and the success of 
ecumenism will require a kenosis, a 
relinquishing of power and the self-
effacement of all involved. 
The path to self-effacement is 
painful; the habit of self-assertion dies 
hard. Sulivan is a reliable, challenging 
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guide on the interior journey that can 
lead to such a death-and to the 
rebirth of one's deepest self, "where 
decisions are made" (ML, 25). He aims 
to strip us of our too-habitual 
assumptions and assertions of piety: 
"May this book leave you broken and 
dispossessed" (ML, 84). But the scene 
of dispossession might be that of 
plenitude. Sulivan 's words-like 
those of some students-seek to open 
a place for a new, more radical 
reception of the Word, and the 
inspiration that can follow. For the 
attentive reader, they succeed in 
fostering "the creative liberty of men 
and women wounded by the Gospel" 
(ML, 6). 
Paul J. Contino 
Mark Kline Taylor. Remembering 
Esperanza: A Cultural-Political Theology 
for North American Praxis. Maryknoll, 
New York: Orbis Books, 1990. $29.95 
(cloth), $16.95 (paper). 
The burden of this book is to 
reflect critically upon Christian 
theology and its "postmodern" cultural 
and political situation. Taylor 
characterizes this situation as 
"trilemmic" such that each of three 
concerns threatens to displace the 
others: to acknowledge tradition, to 
celebrate cultural plurality, and to 
resist political domination. How can 
we celebrate plurality without falling 
into a toothless relativism which 
dissolves tradition and the moral basis 
of resistance to domination? How can 
we affirm Western tradition without 
denying the legitimacy of "non-
Western" traditions? How can we 
resist domination without rejecting 
tradition and plurality? These 
questions are especially relevant for 
college and university communities as 
they reexamine their curricula and 
aims in light of recent challenges to 
the hegemony of European, Western 
traditions in higher education. The 
pointed and perceptive way in which 
Taylor puts his finger on our 
postmodern problem is one of the 
achievements of his book. 
Taylor offers no simple formula 
for solving these vexing conflicts, but 
his aim is to theorize in ways that take 
them seriously. The general direction 
of his "way out" of the trilemma is to 
privilege the need to resist oppression 
when this conflicts with tradition or 
cultural plurality. The final aim of 
resisting oppression is to affirm and 
celebrate differences. Taylor enrolls 
tradition, and specifically Christian 
theology, in the project of resisting 
oppression and affirming cultural 
plurality. He focuses upon four major 
forms of oppression-sexism, 
heterosexism, classism, and racism-
developing his analyses in ways 
attentive to their bearing upon 
plurality. 
Though he sees important 
differences among these forms of 
oppression, Taylor argues that the 
unifying source of oppression resides 
in fear of "otherness" and the related 
need to control that which threatens 
people in power. He begins with 
sexism, not because it is the root of all 
other oppressions, but because it is 
more ubiquitous and more accessible 
to himself as a white, male, affluent, 
heterosexual, Princeton Seminary 
professor. Taylor argues that 
patriarchy is motivated and sustained 
by a matriphobic and matricidal 
mythos. In making his case, he draws 
from anthropology, mythology, and 
psychoanalytic feminist theory. 
Greek, Babylonian, and Hebrew 
mythic traditions, argues Taylor, have 
as a pervasive feature the defeat and 
control of "mother-identified" powers. 
Perhaps the clearest example here is 
the Babylonian creation epic, in which 
the male hero, Marduk, attacks and 
dismembers the female, Tiamat 
(representing the primordial matrix of 
existence), and creates the cosmos out 
of her carcass. Males, threatened by 
differences between themselves and 
their mothers, diminish, control, or 
destroy women. According to Taylor, 
this basic theme is also dominant in 
the Hebrew Bible and Greek 
traditions. Add to this a general 
diminution of women's cultural and 
economic powers to oppress women, 
and the outcome is sexism. The fear 
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of otherness, and related need to 
control, is also a central feature to 
Taylor's analysis of other forms of 
oppression: 
The abstracting from the mother. .. not 
only involves the continual subordinating 
of women to men ... (sexism); it also 
involves the alienation of women and men 
from intimate friendship with their own 
gender and from being at home with their 
own bodies (hetero-realism), the 
alienation of women and men from just 
distribution of the earth's goods (classism), 
and, further, the systematic 
dismemberment of black men and 
women's bodies and lives (racism) 
(147). 
Taylor denies that matricide is 
the single cause of all oppression; 
more than other books with similar 
concerns, this one resists simplistic, 
monocausal explanations of 
oppression (and of anything else). 
These are inseparable, interlocked 
modes of oppression. But he does 
claim that matricide is the heuristic 
key in that it provides a deep and 
perverse dynamic unifying varied 
forms of oppression in ways which 
other candidates do not 
Although this unifying center 
makes for extremely provocative 
analysis, it also gives rise to objections. 
Why should sexism be the mode of 
oppression which unifies the other 
three modes? The astonishing 
prevalence and severity of absolute 
poverty arguably makes classism a 
more basic form of oppression than 
sexism, and call for political and 
economic analyses rather than the 
anthropological and psychological 
analyses that Taylor seems to favor. 
Taylor's sense that, at bottom, all 
oppression is a failure to deal with 
"otherness" fits the central role he 
gives to sexism, but his clear ranking 
of the need to resist oppression over 
the need to celebrate plurality would 
seem to favor classism as heuristically 
primary when treating interlocking 
oppressions. Why give any one of the 
four modes of oppression heuristic 
primacy? Racism would seem to be 
more central than sexism for 
interpreting the multiple forms of 
oppression plaguing Native American 
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communities. 
Even if one agrees that sexism is 
heuristically primary as the unifying 
dynamic of oppression, one might 
argue with his claim that matricide is 
the basic dynamic of sexism. His 
support for the claim that the 
matricidal tenor of the Babylonian 
creation epic is also found in Genesis 
is tenuous at best. Though it is 
plausible to say that Genesis expresses 
a clear subordination of women to 
men, it is stretching the evidence to 
say that Genesis locates the roots of 
this subordination in matricidal or 
matriphobic impulses. Taylor is well 
aware of other explanations of the 
deep roots of sexism. Perhaps it is his 
own longstanding interest in 
anthropology and religious mythos 
that leads him to see the matricidal 
origins of sexism more clearly than, 
say, economic or political ones. 
Interestingly, emancipation from 
political oppression is more 
fundamental than the celebration of 
plurality for Taylor's view of Jesus 
Christ. The priority here is more 
strategic than absolute; Taylor tends to 
see Christian theology as "strategic" in 
the sense that the central normative 
concern is how to get a theology that 
supports liberation from oppression 
and affirmation of difference. A 
central problem for Taylor is that the 
Christian "mythos" (Christianity's 
narratives and communal practices) 
has often served to exacerbate rather 
than to alleviate sexism, heterosexism, 
racism, and classism. He confesses 
that Christian scriptures are 
"androcentric, patriarchal, at other 
points racist and anti-Semitic, too" 
(162). For him the problem is much 
deeper than misusing the Bible. 
Therefore he expresses sympathy with 
those who reject Christianity, saying 
that they are making an "authentic 
and appropriate" response. 
Although Taylor respects those 
who make this "authentic" response, 
he chooses instead to remain 
Christian. He does so because there 
are examples of Christian 
communities that resist oppression 
and because Christianity offers vital 
resources which might be marshalled 
in the cause of justice and freedom. 
The heart of his revised Christianity is 
the claim that "Jesus Christ" refers 
primarily to a social and historical 
dynamic emancipating the oppressed 
and reconciling cultural differences. 
People experience Jesus Christ, th n, 
when they are participate in pro· cts of 
liberation from sexism, hete 
racism, and classism. 
The root metaphor Taylor 
proposes to guide a revised 
understanding of Jesus Christ 
identified above is "Christ us Mater." 
"Christ our Mother," says Taylor, holds 
more power to liberate us from the 
matricidal impulses beneath all 
oppression than do other images of 
Christ. "Christus Mater is a root 
metaphor, then for a general 
maternalization of hmpan community 
and nature that is emancipatory for 
women in struggle against sexism, but 
also for a maternalization that includes 
the materialization of all creation's 
hopes for emancipation from that 
which enchains it, pollutes it, destroys 
it" (196). Taylor is aware of objections 
to his proposals-from the side of 
Christian theology and of feminist 
theory-but he advances them 
nonetheless, though with clarification 
and qualifications. 
Taylor's efforts to revise 
traditional understandings of Christ in 
light of our trilemmic situation are 
instructive in many ways. Too many 
theologians are blind to the ways their 
claims perpetuate injury to others, or 
simply are irrelevant to today's 
pressing problems. But the blatant 
way .Taylor submits theology to 
projects of liberation, and to specific 
interpretations of these projects, is 
troubling. He is intensely aware of 
difficulties surrounding traditional 
sources of authority for theology. 
Thus he declares, "All exegesis is, in 
fact, eisegesis, but there remains a need 
to display the traits of the texts 
themselves that are consonant with 
one's interpretation" (182). For him, 
the Bible and traditional Church 
teachings provide a vast and diverse 
theological smorgasbord. Since 
theological and moral content of these 
sources is malleable and almost 
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endlessly multivalent, selection and 
reconstruction are to be determined 
primarily by the interests of the 
interpreter rather than by the Biblical 
text or by a combination of text and 
the confessional heritage of the 
Church. 
I wish Taylor were as suspicious of 
his own interpretation of the sources of 
oppression as he is of traditional sources 
of theological authority. The 
multivalence of our social and cultural 
situation is as diverse as, if not more 
diverse than, that of the Bible. Some of 
the more radical theorists of 
oppression-those whose rage distorts 
reality with reductionistic analyses--are 
capaciously tolerated, perhaps because 
of Taylor's guilt feelings stemming from 
his membership in the class of white, 
affluent, heterosexual males. His 
focus upon sexism and matricide as 
the heurisitic center for understanding 
our situation leads to illuminating 
analyses of both our situation and the 
Christian tradition, but it fails to do 
justice to elements of Christian faith 
which might challenge this analysis. 
"Christ Our Mother" as a root 
metaphor for Jesus •Christ, for 
example, is a very provdcative way to 
think about Christ. But if this is the 
root metaphor, then what happens to 
Christ, sent by the Father and 
empowered by the Spirit to free the 
world from sin and evil and to renew 
the face of the earth? What happens 
to the theocentric themes in the Bible 
and tradition - themes which, 
without blinding us to or hardening us 
against the suffering of this world, 
relativize the world and its projects 
and practices? 
We are in Taylor's debt for 
writing such a clear analysis of 
profound problems; any careful reader 
will benefit from the helpful ways he 
poses issues, makes his choices, and 
supports them. His passion for justice 
and compassion with those who suffer 
is inspiring. Social theorists wishing to 
explore the relevance of their 
disciplines to a thoughtful Christian 
practice will find this book stimulating. 
Those who cavalierly dismiss all 
liberation theorists as reductionistic or 
mutually contradictory will find here 
an important challenge. But Taylor's 
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systematic, intentional subordination 
of scripture and Church to projects of 
liberation is, ironically, in danger of 
cutting Christians off from the very 
sources of grace and truth that 
empower them to resist oppression 
and affirm difference. 
Douglas]. Schuurman 
Alison Leslie Gold. Clairvoyant: A Novel 
of the Imagined Life of Lucia Joyce. New 
York: Hyperion, 1992. Pp. 176. 
$ 19.99. 
The life and times of James Joyce 
merited the meticulous care of an 
EHmann. Joyce's contribution to 
Western literature could not have 
been fully appreciated, moreover, 
without the careful work of a host of 
scholars who have enriched our 
reading of the giant by their careful 
comments. But there comes a point 
when scholarship can be lethal. 
Paddy Kavanagh, one oflreland's 
most famous poet laureates, once 
asked, "Who killed James Joyce?" His 
answer, of course, was that academics 
had. The first weapon used "to slay 
mighty Ulysses" was a Harvard thesis. 
Further blows were inflicted by essays 
that gained American students 
scholarships at Trinity College. 
0 Paul Contino teaches 
humanities in Christ (Honors) College 
at VU. He has recently completed his 
degree in literature at Notre Dame. 
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Olaf College. 
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Dean of the School of Law at VU. 
0 I. John Hesse link is Albertus C. 
Van Raalte Professor of Systematic 
Theology at Western Theological 
Seminary, Holland, Michigan, and the 
author of Calvin's Concept of the Law. 
Hundreds of conferences and 
thousands of articles later, the Joyce 
industry has more than amply 
demonstrated Kavanagh's point. 
There is only so much that can be 
written about any author-even a 
magnificent one like Joyce-before 
the author can fall victim to critical 
cannibalism, his vitality sapped, his life 
blood drained by a descent into trivia. 
Any new book aboutJoyce comes into 
print with a rebuttable presumption 
that it is unnecessary. Alison Leslie 
Gold (co-author of the story of Miep 
Gies, the woman who helped the 
family of Anne Frank to hide from the 
Nazis in Amsterdam) has overcome 
this presumption and added 
something of value in her first novel. 
If there is any lacuna in the 
scholarship about James Joyce, it is 
probably with respect to his daughter 
Lucia, who was clinically diagnosed as 
a schizophrenic (among other things) 
and who was confined to various 
mental institutions in France, 
Switzerland and England for nearly 
half a century until she died alone in a 
geriatric ward in Northampton near 
the end of 1982. ln1935 Lucia-then 
28-was hospitalized in a clinic outside 
of Paris. She saw her beloved father 
on Sunday visits, when he would 
repeatedly reassure her that she would 
get well (as close as he ever came to 
acknowledging that she was sick), but 
she was never reunited with him 
before he died suddenly in 1941. Her 
mother Nora did not visit her in the 
asylum and never saw her after the 
War. The solicitors for her father's 
estate refused her repeated requests 
for funds to travel to see her brother 
Giorgio, with whom she had one visit 
in 1967. At her own request Lucia was 
buried not in Zurich beside her 
parents and brother, but in a quiet 
spot in England under the shade of a 
chestnut tree. The biographers note 
that the roar of the great lion at the 
Zurich zoo can be heard night and day 
near the Joyce grave in Fluntern 
Cemetery. They imagine this powerful 
voice celebrates the greatness of the 
father. Gold's Lucia knows better: it is 
her absence from that grave-the 
"empty hole in the ground "-that 
evokes the lion's roar. 
The Cresset 
Lucia's long and lonely isolation 
from her family did not inhibit the 
Joyce scholars, including EHmann, 
from calling on her to learn any details 
about her father she might supply. 
Before the appearance of this work, 
however, few, if any, found Lucia Joyce 
interesting in her own right. Gold 
treats Lucia as a subject of fiction, not 
an object of biography, or-worse 
yet-of pity. She has empowered the 
female voice of one not normally 
acknowledged as one of James Joyce's 
women. 
In constructing her novel, Gold 
has relied on EHmann's masterful 
work and on the other contributions 
of leading Joyce scholars. She does 
not join their fascination with turning 
up new bits of information about the 
Joyce family. To her credit, Gold has 
taken care to respect the private and 
personal lives of her subjects. As she 
states in an afterword: "No use has 
been made of medical records nor of 
intimate letters that invade family 
privacy." At one level Gold's work has 
the strength of an historical novel. 
Never far from her story are the major 
events and the chief figures in the life 
of the Joyces. Far more significantly, 
though, Gold has created an image of 
the complicated inner life of her 
protagonist. 
Lucia's imagined autobiography 
unfolds at intervals spaced in decades 
from her twenties to her seventies. 
Appropriately, the memory of the past 
is scrambled. The story begins at 
Lucia's fortieth year, then cuts back to 
an ingenious sketch of her childhood 
and adolescence cast in the form of 
notes for an opera set in Trieste, 
Zurich, and Paris, and featuring Lucia 
as the Soprano, Papa as the Tenor, 
and Marna as the Mezzo-soprano. The 
chapter "At Fifty" flashes forward to 
the condition of a sedated patient 
whose lessened violence and increased 
lucidity is ascribed to the newly 
discovered antipsychotic drug 
Thorazine. The long-term effects of 
this medication are described in the 
following chapter "At Sixty." 
In a lovely spoof on Joycean 
scholars, Gold has a middle-aged 
professor named Carr (one thinks of 
the bureaucrat in the British consulate 
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in Zurich whom Lucia's litigious father 
sued for libel, and whom Torn 
Stoppard transforms into the central 
figure of Travesties) turning up at 
Lucia's asylum armed with a letter 
from the solicitors for her father's 
estate permitting a series of interviews. 
Lucia remembers him all right, "but 
not with pleasure." Carr obtains 
Lucia's brief essay, "The War," and 
reads it to a Joyce Symposium in 
Cologne in 1970, despite the delicious 
irony that Lucia reports that her father 
refused refuge from the Nazis in 
England "because he called the 
English a reptile-like race ending with 
Mr Carr, a true snake who turned and 
spat at us after fifteen years a friend." 
As "Joyce scholarship was 
growing more lively with each passing 
year," Lucia's newly discovered essay-
actually a copy rewritten by Lucia's 
nurse-fetches a high price paid by 
the oil-rich University of Texas 
outbidding libraries in London and 
Prague. Lucia notes both that her 
essay "was of little use to Joyce 
scholarship" and that it formed the 
basis for eight Ph.D. theses. Lucia the 
septuagenarian is "too tired and fed 
up with the past" to help the Joyce 
scholars and biographers any more. 
Finding the experience of dealing with 
the never-ending army of the curious 
to be "heart-pilfering," Lucia has an ad 
run in the newspaper asking the Joyce 
scholars not to bother her any more. 
The two central and lengthiest 
chapters, "At Twenty" and "At Thirty," 
contain Lucia's memoirs, dubbed 
"The Story of the Blotting-Paper Girl 
(Keep Them Guessing for 300 Years)." 
The world depression is in the Parisian 
air. More than an economic fact, 
depression is a psychological reality 
among the characters that crowd into 
Lucia's life. There are hard times not 
only for the Joyces, but also for their 
friends, Samuel Beckett and Ezra 
Pound. Lucia "wept 
much more than Mother had wept." 
Ellrnann describes the daily visits of 
Beckett to the Joyce household as 
exchanges of silence; the fictional 
Lucia recalls the degrees of intensity of 
these eerie silences: 'from wistful to 
dirge-like.' But she also remembers 
Beckett courting and spurning her; 
hers too is the memory of the faithful 
Beckett who kept in touch with her 
during the war and sent her a birthday 
present every year until she died. The 
biographers uniformly describe 
Lucia's love affairs as sad; by contrast 
the fictional Lucia's coming of age was 
passionate and intense. 
In Zurich Lucia consults as a 
patient with Carl Gustav Jung. She 
recalls her father's characterization of 
Jung as "a Swiss Tweed led urn" and 
Freud as "the Viennese Tweedledee," 
but she does not share this memory 
with Dr. Jung. Nor does she reveal her 
recurrent dream that Europe would 
soon be criss-crossed by hobnail boots, 
"for fear that giving voice to this secret 
information would ... actually cause it to 
occur." For all her father's conviction 
that "what might be construed as 
incomprehensible nonsense to others 
were flashes of imagination and 
wisdom," after repeated suicide 
attempts Lucia finds that all of her 
doors and windows "now contained 
locks." 
Weekly contacts between Lucia 
and her father are recalled tenderly, 
even nostalgically. Despite the 
omnipresenc~ of a hefty nurse, "Father 
and I played the piano together each 
Sunday, sang together, ate Italian 
cakes together." Through the 
daughter's eyes we glimpse an intense 
portrait of the artist as an old man 
after the completion of Ulysses: 
"immobile on a bench on a quiet 
street of Paris ... , every muscle and 
sinew gone slack ... , seeing nothing 
through his useless eyes but dancing 
specks of white light in the left and the 
pale mauve shadow of two trees with 
his right." 
Like Stoppard 's brilliant 
inversion of Hamlet, in which the tale 
of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is as 
plausible as that of slain royalty, Gold's 
Clairoayanl makes Lucia Joyce come to 
life as vividly as many of the characters 
of The Dubliners, if not those of 
Bloomsday itself. 
If Kavanagh was right in warning 
that scholars could "slay mighty 
Ulysses" with their dissertations, we 
can be grateful that Gold has not 
added to the trivia Joyceana, but has 
produced a moving piece of fiction in 
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the Joycean mode. It is a more fitting 
tribute to Lucia than her father's 
insistence that his daughter was not 
sick, but clairvoyant (which gives rise to 
the title). As the fictional Lucia puts it: 
"He looked for messages in my flights 
of thought in conversation, 
in my distractions." It is Gold who has 
found those messages and given us in 
this novel of Lucia's imagined life the 
sort of work in which Joyce himself 
would have taken more delight than in 
dozens of the efforts by critics to 
unravel his own work. 
Edward McGlynn Gaffney 
Masao Takenaka and Ron O'Grady. 
The Bible Through Asian Eyes. New York: 
Friendship Press, 1991. pp. 200. 
$35.00 (cloth), $25.00 (paper). 
This is a splendidly conceived 
and beautifully produced volume. The 
authors deserve much of the credit in 
selecting the more than 100 works 
from eighteen countries in Asia, for 
they are respectively chair and vice-
chairpersons of the Asian Christian Art 
Association which is behind this 
venture. Neither of the authors is an 
artist or professor of art, but each has 
had a long-standing interest in 
Christian art in Asia and has played an 
important role in promoting it. Dr. 
Takenaka is professor of Christian 
ethics at Doshisha Univeristy in Japan 
whereas Ron O'Grady is a minister of 
the Associated Churches of Christ in 
New Zealand and former Associate 
General Secretary of the Christian 
Conference of Asia. Takenaka 
published the first collection of similar 
works, Christian Art in Asia, in 1975, 
and this led to the formation of the 
Asian Christian Art Association. 
The ecumenical, international 
scope of this venture is remarkable. 
Friendship Press is only the distributor 
(in the USA). The actual publisher is 
Pace Publishing in New Zealand, and 
the printing was done in Hong Kong. 
Support for this volume came from 
Protestant and Roman Catholic 
missionary societies in Canada, 
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Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden-and from the Suntory 
Foundation in Japan. 
The format of this volume is 
attractive and illuminating. Facing the 
artistic works, which are in full color, is 
a page of text which consists of a brief 
explanation of the artist and his or her 
medium and technique, a relevant 
scripture passage, followed by an 
appropriate reflection or meditation 
either by some well-known Asian writer 
or by the authors of this book. The 
visual and verbal contributions 
compliment each other nicely, but 
either would stand by itself as a thing 
of beauty. 
I am not an artist, nor an artist's 
son (to paraphrase Amos), although I 
acted as an interpreter for a number of 
contemporary print artists during our 
last years as missionaries in Japan. 
Hence, I am not qualified to make 
critical judgements about the quality of 
the artistic contributions. 
Nevertheless, I venture that most of 
these works would more than pass 
muster by any artistic criteria. The 
overall impression is one of strength 
and vitality. The genre vary from folk 
art, wood carvings and traditional oils, 
acrylics and prints, to flower 
arrangements on concrete blocks, laser 
art, and bronze wall sculptures. 
A few pictures are reminiscent of 
older American Sunday school cards, 
but for the most part they avoid the 
maudlin, cloying Christian art seen too 
often in this country. Some are stark 
in their realism, others striking 
abstractions which convey something 
of the opresson and suffering 
experienced by many Christians in 
Asia. 
My only reservation is with an 
occasional eclectic comment in the 
text. I question, for example, the 
assertion of Jyoti Saki, an Indian artist 
and theologian: 
It appears to me that a Buddhist, Hindu, 
Moslem or even an agnostic can represent 
Jesus as an authentic expression of his or 
her belief. That is, the image of Jesus can 
represent a true confession of faith for 
believing Hindu, Buddhist or Moslem. 
To say that Jesus can have a 
universal appeal for people of all faiths 
or no faith is one thing. To say, 
however, that "the image of Jesus can 
represent a true confession of faith for a 
believing Hindu, Buddhist or Moslem" 
is something else (my italics). The 
understanding of guilt, grace, and 
redemption varies so much in the 
different faiths that it does not do 
justice to any one of them to suggest 
that the Christ of the Christian faith 
can be confessed faithfully by a Hindu 
or a Muslim. 
Despite this demurral, I can 
recommend the book with great 
enthusiasm. It is not only a feast for 
the eyes and a stimulus for the heart 
and mind; it also deepens one's faith 
and gives fresh new understanding of 
familiar Biblical scenes. As the authors 
point out, "Asian eyes may indeed have 
a unique way of viewing reality which 
will help [us] to see familiar things in a 
new perspective." To savor this book is 
both a religious and an aesthetic 
experience. 
I. John Hesselink 
Notes on Poets .•• 
J. T. Ledbetter teaches at California 
Lutheran College. His works have 
appeared in dozens of magazines, and, 
we are pleased to say, frequently in The 
Cresset. 
Stu Selthun is a 1986 VU grad who has 
taught in China and now works as a 
computer programmer for the 
University of Phoenix. He is working 
on a novel. 
Daniel J. Langton has published in 
Poetry, Nation, Atlantic, Paris Review, 
American Scholar, and The Cresset. His 
Querencia won the Devins Award for 





I don't know why 
but you are wearing a hat, 
a hat you would never wear 
in your dream. 
There is a gate 
a young man would vault, 
I would open 
or watch it opened 
or stand before. 
Of course there are birds 
sending signals called song 
as we stand there, 
Two Poems 
by 
Daniel J. Langton 
the gate getting smaller, 
the day dying down. 
Flesh Wound 
Your letter rumples the window seat, 
pleated as carelessly as the dress 
you wore to Paris in another time, 
when today was all there was, we had no past 
and didn't know the future tense. You asked 
for nothing, not even a question, sublime 
in yourself, the world a rueful mess 
you hadn't caused, love a religious retreat. 
Now you write: What can we do if the centers 
aren ' t holding, the edges are as dead 
as skin about to fall, the things that mattered 
are broken, bruised, smashed and scattered? 
I remember that woman, and what she said: 
The healing begins as the bullet enters. 
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